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THESIS

**THE CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: A
DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF A SHARED SECURITY
CULTURE IN EUROPE?**

by

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December 2007

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**THE CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: A DISTINCTIVE
FEATURE OF A SHARED SECURITY CULTURE IN EUROPE?**

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, most European states have begun to incorporate a broader understanding of security in their security documents and policies. As a result, security is understood in a more comprehensive way. This broader understanding of security includes, for example, issue-areas such as economics, human rights, and/or the environment. In this context, this study examines whether the adoption of the concept of a comprehensive security is leading to a convergence of the security cultures in Europe. This study examines, first, the concepts of comprehensive security and security culture. Then, using a method of structured, focused comparison, the guiding security policy documents and policies of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland are examined with a focus on questions related to multilateralism and use of force. Analyzing these key factors and their implementation results in a better understanding of what the concept of comprehensive security implies for Europe and whether this may lead to a rapprochement of the different national security cultures. This study demonstrates that even though Europe still displays considerable heterogeneity as to diverse national understandings of security, one finds a tendency toward convergence, which leads to a growing European security culture.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has increasingly acted with more autonomy in security affairs. The deepening and widening of the European Union (EU) has additionally inspired widespread cooperation among its members. Moreover, through the crisis in its own backyard, in the Balkans, Europe has been forced to rethink its own security agenda. Finally, since the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, and even more dramatically, with the wars on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, the relationship of Europe to its transatlantic ally, the United States, has undergone dramatic strains. However, security perceptions and policies differ significantly among the European countries, too. The varied reactions to the war in Iraq 2003 clearly demonstrate these diverging priorities. Consequently, one can observe different concepts of security among European countries.

Due not only to the differences of opinion over Iraq, most European states have begun to incorporate a broader understanding of security in their security documents and policies. As a result, security is understood in a more comprehensive way. This thesis defines comprehensive security as an understanding of security that goes beyond the traditional realist state-centric and military approach. This broader understanding of security includes, for example, issue-areas such as economics, human rights, and/or the environment.¹ Simultaneously, the concept of comprehensive security has become a widely discussed topic among academics. With the adoption of the idea of comprehensive security in European politics – on a national level as well as on an EU level – a process of convergence has taken place. The emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991 and the European

1. David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): 5.

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 confirms this development. Moreover, Europe has grown together politically and economically: the enlargement of the EU to 27 members at the beginning of the year 2007 is a sign of this progress. This thesis will, therefore, argue that Europe is heading towards a security community. Such a security community can be defined as a "transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change."² Although CFSP and ESDP are still separate pillars of the EU, which is organized intergovernmentally, and the members of the EU might, therefore, still follow their own security agendas, there is a growing common understanding of security among the member states.

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to study whether the adoption of the concept of comprehensive security is leading to a shared security culture in Europe. In this context, security culture consists of "cognitive, affective, and evaluative predispositions which shape foreign and security perceptions and policies of a collective entity."³

In this respect, it is crucial to mention that each security culture, on all levels, is heterogeneous. That is, elements of commonality as well as divergence occur. It is the amount of commonality that will determine whether there is a common security culture.

This thesis will first explore the basic concepts of comprehensive security as well as security culture. Then, the guiding security policy documents of Germany, Great Britain, as well as Switzerland, will be examined with respect to

2. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the study of security communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30.

3. John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 25. See also: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 32-64; Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World," in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Darryl Howlett, "Strategic Culture. Reviewing Recent Literature," *Strategic Insights* 4, no. 10 (October 2005), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/howlettOct05.asp> (accessed February 15, 2007).

multilateralism and use of force. Analyzing these key factors and their implementation will result in a better understanding of what the concept of comprehensive security implies for Europe and whether this may lead to a rapprochement of the various national security cultures.

The findings will highlight the importance of a common understanding of security and its implications for more agreed upon procedures in security affairs.

B. IMPORTANCE

A central security concern has been Europe's lack of effectiveness and cooperation regarding recent security challenges. For example, the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s disclosed the absence of a common understanding of security guiding European crisis management. In addition, disagreement about how to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks showed, likewise, the absence of a common awareness of security. Regardless of new challenges such as terrorism or intrastate conflicts, the debate about the reorientation of security policies in Europe began slowly. However, current policy documents of individual European states as well as of the European Union, i.e. the European Security Strategy (ESS)⁴ of 2003, contain more and more elements of comprehensive security. Therefore, it is important to discern whether the adoption of such elements increases the level of commonality among the Europeans and allows one to speak of an emerging security culture.

A common security culture of Europe, as a region, may also increase its reliability as an ally. The reactions on both sides of the Atlantic after the dispute over the 2003 war in Iraq were fierce in a way that had never before been seen within the transatlantic relations. However, within Europe itself, serious controversies have arisen because of varied responses to the war in Iraq. The European Security Strategy is the first common strategy document of the European Union. It includes many elements of the concept of comprehensive

4. Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 2003).

security. Because it is a document that comprises far more than the traditional dimensions of security, it is significant to examine whether the ESS signals a move towards a shared security culture.

With the enlargement of the European Union, the edge of this security community approaches “zones of turmoil,”⁵ such as the Caucasus region or the Middle East, and this makes a common understanding of security more and more vital for Europe. In addition, the enlargement of the EU has led to the admission of states with vastly different political and historical backgrounds. A shared security culture would facilitate, therefore, a further integration of Europe.

Furthermore, under the aegis of ESDP, the EU is currently performing seven different operations.⁶ These operations are based on a shared set of core goals. However, it is obvious that the more that a security culture is shared among the individual members of the EU, the broader the set of common goals and the simpler the process of deciding on what the new operations and their exact mission purposes will be. Consequently, ESDP operations might be more efficient, purposeful, and straightforward if guided by a shared security culture.

Finally, a shared security culture matters because of the implication it has for the relations of the individual European countries among themselves. An emerging security culture will be able to strengthen the EU as a security community. Hence, conflicts between the members decrease, and the overall level of security in Europe increases. These developments may have significant effects for Europe as a regional power.

5. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil* (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

6. In the western Balkans: EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) and EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), in the Middle-East: EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah), and the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex)) and in Africa: EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DR Congo), and EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur).

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a vast amount of literature about comprehensive security and security cultures. Although these ideas first emerged after the advent of security studies following World War II, the discussion deepened significantly after the end of the Cold War. The cessation of the bipolar world order, as well as globalization, has had a growing impact on these topics. There appears to be three main groups of literature dealing with the issue of this thesis.

The first group surveys different concepts of security in general.⁷ This literature is primarily about establishing order in the area of security studies. Helga Haftendorn, for example, observes a broadening of the security definition from national security to international security to global security.⁸ David A. Baldwin acknowledges the concept of security to be “broad enough for use at any level.”⁹ Most of the authors, in particular the European ones, accept a wide definition of security. However, Stephen M. Walt, while recognizing a widening of the definition of security, insists that military threats to the national security are the most serious ones. In addition, there is a subgroup of literature, which deals mainly with security in Europe.¹⁰

7. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (ed), *Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Baldwin, “The concept of security,” 5; Barry, Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis* (Boulder/London: Lynne Riewer Publisher, 1998); Katzenstein, “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World;” Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 211-239; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Harvard: Harper Collins, 1989).

8. Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (March 1991): 3-17.

9. Baldwin, “The concept of security,” 24.

10. Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security in the twenty-first Century: Towards a Stable Peace Order?” in *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe*, ed. Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); Vladimir Handl, Kerry Longhurst, and Marcin Zaborowski, “German security policy towards Central Europe,” in *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe*, ed. Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995).

The second group of literature agrees to widen the security concept, but differs on which dimension to prioritize. Within this group, there is much literature about Environmental Security.¹¹ While most of the authors try to establish the environment as a direct security threat or the source of a security threat, Nils Petter Gleditsch proposes to include military conflict itself as an environmental threat.¹² Then, there is the literature about Human Security,¹³ a concept that focuses on the protection of human beings in a comprehensive manner. This concept of security has its roots in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and was adopted by Canada and Japan.¹⁴ Finally, there is work about Societal Security, a concept that is closely linked to constructivism. The most important group of authors in this area is the Copenhagen School, a school of thought that stresses mainly identity, culture and knowledge rather than material issues.¹⁵

The third group, which has recently materialized, consists of literature discussing whether there is, in fact, an emerging European Security Culture.¹⁶

11. Nina Graeger, "Environmental Security?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1 (February 1996): 109-116; Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" *International Security* 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 35-62; Braden B. Allenby, "Environmental Security: Concept and Implementation," *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique* 21, no. 1 (January 2000): 5-21; Eric K. Stern, "Bringing the Environment In: The Case For Comprehensive Security," *Cooperation and Conflict* 30 (1995): 211-237.

12. Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 3 (1998): 393.

13. Roland Paris, "Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 87-102; Astrid Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests of States," *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (September 1999): 265-276; Oliver Richmond, "Human Security, the 'Rule of Law,' and NGOs: Potentials and Problems for Humanitarian Intervention," *Human Rights Review* 2, no. 4 (July-September 2001).

14. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York, Oxford University Press: 1994).

15. Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

16. Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the study of security communities," 30; Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," in *The Future of European Security*, ed. Beverly Crawford (Berkley, UC Berkley: 1998); Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture," *International Affairs* 3 (2001): 587-604; Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force," in: Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda, ed. Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). Sten Rynning, "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?" *Security Dialog* 34, no. 4 (2003): 479-496.

The European Union is recognized as a vehicle that might forge a common culture because it has become “a political-institutional project.”¹⁷ However, in respect to a security community, the academic research has mainly focused on NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), not on the EU.¹⁸

In sum, there is a plethora of literature on the different concepts of security and the tendency to identify Europe as a security community. However, the existing literature does not analyze how the concept of comprehensive security has been adopted by individual EU member states, nor does it analyze how this process is linked to the formation of a common security culture in Europe. In particular, a conspicuous gap remains in the area of reviewing and comparing security documents.

The theoretical approach of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in analyzing the process of building a security community may be helpful. These authors take the following points as evidence for the emergence of a security community: multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, common definition of the threat, and the discourse and language of community.¹⁹

There is a major debate relevant for the topic, a debate regarding the existence or the growth of a European security culture. With the enlargement of the European Union as well as the division of Europe with respect to the war on terror in Iraq, there seem to be two main points of view regarding this subject.

The first view is cautious in observing a common security culture in Europe and stresses diversity among the different countries in Europe. Adrian Hyde-Price and Vladimir Handl, for example, emphasize the different historical,

17. Ole Waever, “Societal security: the concept,” in: *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, ed. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996): 79.

18. Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model,” in: *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

19. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security communities,” 55-56.

geographical, and cultural backgrounds of the states.²⁰ In addition, Andrew Cottey mentions the more “pragmatic view” of countries in East-Central Europe.²¹ In other words, states in East-Central Europe seem to be still more influenced by ideas of power balancing than that of a shared collective identity in Western Europe. Likewise, Sten Rynning identifies differences among national security cultures.²²

The second view considers that Europe is on its way to a common security culture. Christoph O. Meyer argues that a convergence towards a European security culture progressively takes place through the mechanism of social learning.²³ Furthermore, Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards identify steps to a European strategic culture in the light of the creation of the common European Security and Defense Policy.²⁴

Finally, the policy debates which revolve around the concept of comprehensive security concern not so much the concept itself but rather diverging priorities. For instance, multilateralism is strongly appreciated in most of the European security documents. However, preferences for partners or coalitions to work with vary strongly between states. A further example is terrorism, which is accepted as a leading threat to the security of a state or a community. Nevertheless, the priority of terrorism in the threat assessments diverges in the different security documents.

20. Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security in the Twenty-first Century: Towards a Stable Peace Order?” in *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe*, ed. Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 139; Handl, Longhurst, and Zaborowski, “German security policy towards Central Europe,” 80.

21. Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War*, 157.

22. Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?”

23. Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 523 (2005): 524

24. Cornish and Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The beginnings of a European strategic culture,” 587.

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

The major question to be answered in this thesis will be whether the concept of comprehensive security, embodied in most security documents of European countries in the last years, is helping to forge a shared security culture in Europe. While responding to this main research question, the thesis will also discuss the following sub-questions: Which dimensions of security are essential for the emergence of a common security culture? Is there a common security culture between Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland, diverse as they appear to be?

This thesis will demonstrate that even though Europe still encounters considerable heterogeneity as to diverse national understandings of security, one observes a tendency toward convergence leading to a genuine European security culture.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis will focus first conceptualize the main analytical instruments, comprehensive security and security culture, and second evaluate the relevant security documents, based mainly on qualitative content analysis. In the conceptual part, the thesis will specify the independent variable (IV), the concept of a comprehensive security. It will then examine and attempt to determine which elements of security are decisive for the emergence of a common security culture. At the same time, the theoretical approach will also define the dependent variable (DV), the security culture itself. The sources regarding the conceptual approach are mainly secondary sources. The research is based on literature from European and American scholars.

In the second part, Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland will act as case studies. Each case study contains a review of the development of comprehensive security approach in the respective country as well as an overview over its security culture. To make out the details of possible changes in

security culture since the end of the Cold War, this thesis will employ the method of a structured, focused comparison.²⁵ In this connection, the following four questions, with respect to the timeframe from the end of the Cold War to the present, are asked:

- What are the modifications regarding the use of force abroad?
- What are the adjustments in preferences for multilateral versus bilateral approaches in the international system?
- How has the relationship to multilateral security institutions developed?
- What are the changes in democratic accountability for the use of force abroad?

The adoption of the notion of comprehensive security is understood as a causal factor for possible changes. The sources in this main part of the thesis are, to the extent feasible, primary sources: security documents of the examined states. Secondary literature and a variety of opinion polls and newspaper interviews serve as additional sources.

In the third part, based on the aforementioned questions, the adjustments and modifications in national security cultures of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland are compared. Thereby, eventual convergences of the national security cultures and thus a potential convergence toward a European security culture are examined.

The cases are selected in view of a maximum of variance. The countries selected display different historical and political backgrounds. Germany is the pivotal power in Europe and its ideas about security policy have influenced other states significantly. Furthermore, after the reunification of 1989/1990, Germany experienced a dramatic change in its foreign policy while sending a larger

25. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet. *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 67-124.

number of troops abroad. However, Germany is also the country that still clings to the concept of soft power²⁶ under a "policy of restraint" that is a consequence of the Nazi experience. Next, Great Britain is the closest ally of the United States in Europe and shares more common ground in security with its transatlantic partner than any other country in Europe. In addition, in contrast to Germany, Great Britain is taking part in the war on terror in Iraq. Finally, Switzerland is neither an EU nor a NATO member. However, Switzerland is, despite its neutrality, linked to European security. Contingents of the Swiss armed forces participate in operations of both organizations, the EU (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and NATO (in Kosovo). Moreover, in contrast to Germany and Great Britain, Switzerland was never member of a military alliance during the Cold War.

26. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

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II. CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

A. CONCEPTS OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

1. Concepts of Security

There are diverging views as to how far the concept of security should be widened. The various approaches are closely tied to three main schools in International Relations: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. The debate between these schools concerning security is the focal point of the discipline.

First, the concept of security in realism is focused on the nation state and national interests. Moreover, as the survival of the state is pivotal, security and defense policies and military means are crucial.²⁷ Whereas defensive realists, such as Kenneth N. Waltz, concentrate on security,²⁸ offensive realists, such as John J. Mearsheimer, see states as power maximizers.²⁹ Indeed, military capabilities are at the center of both. Likewise, neorealists, such as Stephen M. Walt, acknowledge security in this narrow realm of the nation state.³⁰ This concept of security, so called national security, was the predominant scholarly view until the 1980s.

Second, neoliberal theories of International Relations allow a broader and wider understanding of security. Primarily, neoliberal institutionalists challenged realism and its idea of national security with the notion of complex interdependence, derived foremost from the rising importance and worldwide

27. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, rev. Kenneth W. Thomsen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 27.

28. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Studies* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

29. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-57.

30. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3-43.

interconnectedness of the economy.³¹ In particular, institutionalists stress the security relevance of international cooperation and institutions.³² Their view of international relations is, consequently, more benign than the rather pessimistic realist view, despite sharing the same starting assumptions of anarchy and self-help and seeing states as rational utility maximizers.

Third, the constructivist school believes that security itself is socially constructed, along with interests, threats, and capabilities.³³ This implies that perceptions of security vary among actors and across time and space. Moreover, shared knowledge in a social structure, such as a security community or a state, might be the result of socialization and thus a collective learning process.³⁴

Based on these observations, Helga Haftendorn distinguishes between three different concepts of security, which span from “national security” to “international security” to “global security.” These concepts of security are based on the recognition of fundamental transformations of the international system:

Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats, and capabilities to meet the perceived challenges. Its historical evolution is linked to the extension of the boundaries of the international system, from one of regionally bounded nation-states, to the highly interdependent political systems of the industrialized world, to a global community of people.³⁵

In this context, Haftendorn links the different concepts of security to those philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who are also the main reference

31. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.

32. Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander (ed) *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*; Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983).

33. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 71-81.

34. See for the learning process: Jack Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy. Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 279 - 312; for security communities: Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security communities,” 29-66.

35. Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” 5.

points for the three theories mentioned. She traces national security back to Thomas Hobbes, international security to Hugo De Grotius and global security to Immanuel Kant:

At first glance, the paradigm of national security responds to political realism as taught by Hobbes, while the paradigm of global security follows the Kantian tradition, with its assumption of a community of mankind and political processes controlled by enlightened men. The paradigm of international security, in turn, becomes meaningful with the formation of security regimes and the building of international institutions as Grotius has recommended.³⁶

Haftendorn's thinking in the categories of national security, international security and global security is mainly about the question of whether the security of one state can be guaranteed by itself or whether it has to be manifest in relation to other states.

A further approach to the study of international security is offered by Victor D. Cha who argues that globalization is the significant element which influences current thinking about security.³⁷ In his view, the influence of globalization has been neglected because of the debate over security between the different schools of thought in international relations.

...non-physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm. These security effects translate into certain behavioral tendencies in a state's foreign policy that have thus far not been studied in the literature.³⁸

Cha identifies three main effects on security. First, he states, the delimitation of internal and external security has become blurred. Second, the level of bureaucracy is forced to be innovative in security issues; therefore,

36. Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," 6-7.

37. Victor D. Cha, "Globalization and the Study of International Security," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (May 2000): 391-403.

38. Ibid., 391.

cooperation with partners which are not on the state level achieves an extension of meaning. And third, ordinary ways of fighting as well as thinking strategically have to be reconsidered.³⁹

2. Broadening and Deepening the Concept of Security

Besides different concepts of security, which are linked to theories of International Relations, there are additional concepts which seek to define the security environment. Both the concepts of security which are attributed to a school of thought in International Relations, as well as the previously mentioned thematic concepts, go beyond the narrow realist approach to security. As a result, they either refer to a new level of analysis or add a new dimension to security.

First, Human Security is a concept which covers the protection of human beings in a comprehensive manner. It is in its consequence the continuation of Helga Haftendorn's thoughts about global security.⁴⁰ Consequently, in contrast to realist security concepts, the level of analysis is in this case the individual. Sven Biscop states,

Human Security takes the individual and his community as point of reference, rather than the state, by addressing both military and non-military threats to his/her security. The security of the state is seen not as an end in itself, but as a means of - and necessary precondition for - providing security for people.⁴¹

39. Cha, "Globalization and the Study of International Security," 397-400.

40. Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," 11.

41. Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power* (Aldershot / Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 5.

The roots of the concept are to be found in a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) document of 1994.⁴² Roland Paris lists elements of this concept and mentions “economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political”⁴³ security.

Obviously, human security concerns all elements of a man's life. It has therefore to be understood as the basic philosophy of this UN Programme and not as a claim to be directly and fully applied. In other words, the concept of human security, as reflected in this UN Programme, may be perceived as general guidelines and not as a closed and finalized concept. However, there are authors who have tried to narrow the understanding of human security in a way that can be used, for example, to limit it to “threats to safety and freedom.”⁴⁴ Canada, for instance, has adopted the concept of human security by highlighting five policy priorities: protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety.⁴⁵

A second concept is Environmental Security which seeks to include the dimension of environmental degradation into the concept of national security. In this context, “environment” is mostly defined as a “physical and biological system,”⁴⁶ to clearly distinguish it from areas such as politics, economics or societal issues. However, proponents of the concept of environmental security often stress the interaction of political, economic, and environmental matters as well as their combined influence on security.⁴⁷ Incidentally, Nina Graeber mentions four reasons to link environmental issues and security:

First, environmental degradation is in itself a severe threat to human security and all life on earth....Second, environmental

42. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 22.

43. Paris, “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 90.

44. Booth, quoted in Paris, “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 94.

45. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power*, 5.

46. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” 38.

47. Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no 3 (1998): 299-317.

degradation or change can be both cause or consequence of violent conflict....Third, predictability and control are essential elements of military security considerations, and these are also important elements in the safeguarding of the environment....Finally, a cognitive linkage between the environment and security has been established.⁴⁸

Furthermore, Marc A. Levy highlights two categories of security risks caused by environmental degradation. On the one side, the so called “direct security risks,” which have a direct effect on national security, such as climate change, with the result of large-scale economic disruption; on the other side, “indirect security risks” that affect national security in a rather implied way through political change beyond the concerned state.⁴⁹

Finally, Societal Security is a concept that is closely linked to constructivism. This concept has mainly been developed by the so called “Copenhagen School” around Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The pivotal points in this concept are collective identities of societies which share a common “we-feeling”.⁵⁰ In other words, societal security is “about large, self-sustaining identity groups.”⁵¹ Consequently, it is not necessarily the state, which is in the focus, but a group of people who share a common identity. Buzan explains society in this context as follows:

Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organizations concerned with government.⁵²

Buzan identifies three main threats to societal security: Migration, the overriding influence from a neighboring society or a neighboring collective (horizontal competition), and integrating as well as secessionist projects (vertical

48. Graeger, “Environmental Security?” 109-110.

49. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” 48.

50. Waever, “Societal security: the concept,” 17.

51. Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 119.

52. Ibid.

competition).⁵³ The main critiques of the concept of societal security have come again from the realist school of thought, because no longer is the state, and with it sovereignty, in the center, but rather the identity of a group.⁵⁴

Although broad support has yet to be found for these thematical concepts of environmental security, two main criticisms can be discovered. A first line of disapproval, mainly presented by structural realists, disagrees with the broadening of the security concept at all. Walt, for example, asserts: "Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems."⁵⁵ Another critic argues against a securitization of the environment, questions of human topics, or societal issues, because the quality of a "security issue" implies the "claim to handle something with less democratic control and constraint."⁵⁶

3. A Comprehensive Approach to Security

In this thesis, comprehensive security is conceptualized as an approach towards security issues which is broader than the traditional realist concept and includes the aforementioned dimensions. In other words, security is recognized as a subject that goes beyond the traditional realist state-centric and military approach. The term "comprehensive security" was coined in political and academic circles in Western Europe during the 1980s. Both, the academics as well as the policymakers, were seeking an approach to security which was broader and deeper than the realist notion of security.⁵⁷ However, already in

53. Buzan et al., *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, 121.

54. Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth (London, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 6.

55. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," 213.

56. Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 29.

57. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (Oct 1996): 230, offers an overview of different authors.

1973, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), took a comprehensive view on security, though the approach was named cooperative security.⁵⁸

One can observe mainly three categories which the broadening and widening of the concept of security affects. A first dimension refers to the question of whose security should be guaranteed. In other words, who else, besides the state, may benefit from security - is it just a state or are also groups or even individuals included? Haftendorn argues that security "should be multifocused, not limited to a single issue-area or level of analysis."⁵⁹ Likewise, Baldwin perceives the need for the application of security to many levels of analysis: "Individual, family, society, state, international system, or humanity."⁶⁰ A second category concerns the sources of threat. That is, which sources, besides the realist military threat, have to be comprised in a security concept? Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams argue that such a comprehensive approach to security should "include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration."⁶¹ Moreover, Adler stresses the link among these different issues.⁶² Finally, a third heading relates to the different tools which may be used to face the threats. Therefore, a broader and deeper understanding of security might include, above all, elements such as diplomacy, economics, or human rights. In this context, Baldwin concludes that "like wealth, the goal of security can be pursued by a wide variety of means."⁶³

58. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power*, 3-4.

59. Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," 12.

60. Baldwin, "The concept of security," 6.

61. Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," 230.

62. Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," 306.

63. Baldwin, "The concept of security," 16.

B. SECURITY CULTURES

1. The Nature of Security Cultures

The concept of security in realism is focused on the nation state and national interests. Moreover, as the survival of the state is pivotal, security and defense policies and military means are crucial.⁶⁴ In this context, Alastair Iain Johnston points out that the realist school of thought takes for granted that states are “undifferentiated units that seek to optimize their utility.”

However, supporters of a cultural security approach are convinced that “decision-makers in different societies do indeed think and act differently from one another when faced with similar strategic circumstances and choices.”⁶⁵ In other words, there are further motivations which causally affect the formulation of security policies and which go far beyond material capabilities. These impulses are rooted in the particular security culture of a state or a society.

Ideas of security culture appeared for the first time in the 1940s and 1950s. They attempted to link culture and the behavior of states. A nation’s culture was chiefly characterized by “language, religion, customs, socialization, and the interpretation of common memories.”⁶⁶ A second generation of academic works appeared in the late 1970s. It was Jack Snyder who analyzed Soviet military strategy based on cultural considerations.⁶⁷ The domestic conditions which lead to a distinctive security culture were the focus of this generation of scholars.⁶⁸ Finally, a third generation, strongly influenced by constructivism, appeared in the 1990s. The scholars of the constructivist paradigm took studies

64. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 27.

65. Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 55.

66. Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism.” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4, No. 10 (Oct 2005), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/lantisOct05.asp> (accessed 15 February 2007), 1.

67. Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977).

68. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” 3.

of security culture into consideration and sought to include “a sociological perspective on the politics of national security.”⁶⁹ Proponents of the constructivist approach tried to challenge the shortcomings of realist explanations by taking into account ideas about security culture.

The literature views a security culture as only one of several different cultures that influence decision making. Amongst others, the literature concerns political cultures, security cultures, strategic cultures, and military cultures. There are two ways to bring order in the different forms of culture and hence to isolate the one focus, security culture. First, security cultures can be recognized as the intersection of political, strategic, and diplomatic cultures. Taking this intersection into account, Krause defines security cultures as

enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's / society's interests and values, with respect to security, stability, and peace are perceived, articulated, and advanced.⁷⁰

A second view identifies security culture as one component of a hierarchical order. That is, security culture is to be viewed in a broader way than military culture, but in a narrower sense than political culture.

Obviously, a strict delimitation of the different cultures is not possible and not practicable. Therefore, as a working definition of security culture we might utilize John S. Duffield's definition:

A security culture consists of cognitive, affective, and evaluative predispositions which shape foreign and security perceptions and policies of a collective entity.⁷¹

69. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” In: *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 2.

70. Keith Krause, “Cross Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview;” in *Culture and Security*, ed. Keith R. Krause (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 6.

71. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 23.

As a result, because security culture comprises cognitive, affective, and evaluative components, it goes beyond pure belief systems or ideologies.⁷²

2. Characteristics of Security Cultures

Beginning with Duffield's explanation of political culture, three significant characteristics can be discovered: Political cultures are a property of a collective; they are, in principle, distinctive; and they are highly stable.⁷³ These characteristics are valid for security culture as well, as they do not refer directly to a certain level, but rather, more generally, to all cultures in security affairs.

The first characteristic is that security culture is a property of a collective. In other words, security culture is not based on individual members of a collective, but on shared understandings among the majority of the people who make up the collective. This characteristic has consequences in issues such as the ability to change the security culture, the capacity to "implement" a security culture, and also the relation between the collective and the individual. In this context, the question becomes: What kind of collective may share a common security culture? Whereas a security culture for a state is widely accepted, many scholars also acknowledge a security culture amongst a collectivity of several states.⁷⁴ In other words, when states build a security community with "shared identities, values, and meanings,"⁷⁵ a common security culture may arise. Particularly important for this thesis, the EU is recognized as a vehicle that might forge a common culture because it has become "a political-institutional project."⁷⁶ Thus, security cultures can also form on a regional level.

72. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 23.

73. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 23.

74. Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the study of security communities," 30; Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community;" Cornish and Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture," 587-604; Rynning, "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?" 479-496.

75. Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the study of security communities," 31.

76. Waever, "Societal security: the concept," in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, 79.

The second characteristic of a security culture is its distinctiveness. This feature refers to the critique of the realist view that states are black boxes whose actions are based on objective, material interests. Therefore, although states find themselves in similar situations, they react differently because of their different security cultures.

Finally, the third characteristic, and probably the most discussed, is that security cultures are highly stable. Indeed, Duffield stresses the comparison with material conditions.⁷⁷ Most of the literature, though, admits that change is possible. In this context, authors stress two different modes which might cause change. The first mode of change is a slow one, mostly through socialization. Harry Eckstein uses the tools of socialization and internalization to explain different cultures in general.⁷⁸ Besides this internalization, a further process can fall under these categories, a learning process, including learning through failure.⁷⁹ Among the case studies of this paper, Great Britain has faced such a challenge with the failure of the appeasement politics at the advent of World War II. The second mode of change is a fast and abrupt one. That is, security culture can change dramatically because of “dramatic events or traumatic experiences.”⁸⁰ Germany is the example of a state that went through such dramatic events and traumatic experiences in the time of the Nazis in World War II. Consequently, the security culture of Germany changed significantly after the end of World War II.

In sum, security culture implies that states act differently despite the fact that they are in similar situations. Hence, the studies of security culture might help scholars as well as policy makers in several respects. The first rationale for looking at security cultures is the ability to explain puzzles, in particular where

77. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 23.

78. Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (September 1988): 791.

79. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy. Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.”

80. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 23.

realists are not able to explain a certain outcome. As mentioned previously, this motive was one of the reasons that “the ideas of security culture gained increased relevance after the end of the Cold War.”⁸¹

A close analysis of security cultures helps policy makers deal with other states in a more and more globalizing and thus interconnected world, where intercultural knowledge and sensitivity counts. From a historical point of view, in most cases scholars concentrated on “knowing the enemy.” However, in current security policies, there is often no clearly identifiable enemy. Moreover, the knowledge about security cultures becomes more and more relevant for third party interventions, for instance in diplomatic negotiations, in mediation attempts, in peacekeeping missions, or in cases of stabilization and reconstruction. In this respect, security culture is about avoiding misunderstandings and misperceptions and thus improving policy output. Hence, it is not only about “knowing the enemy,” but also, rather, “knowing the belligerents” or even “knowing the friends.”

3. Factors Shaping Security Cultures

There are, in principle, two diverse factors which might account for different security cultures: material and ideational factors. The several sources that shape security culture often include both factors.⁸² The subsequent categories outline mainly what Darryl Howlett highlights.⁸³

The first source of security culture is the history and experience of a state and nation. In this context, changes of security culture-- because of formative events such as shocks as well as the slower mode of learning-- play a noteworthy role. That is, history can be understood as all of the events a state has experienced. When dealing with history, one has to decide when the historical starting point should be for identifying the roots of a security culture.⁸⁴

81. Marca, Preemption in U.S. Strategic Culture, 5.

82. Howlett, “Strategic Culture. Reviewing Recent Literature,” 4.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

For example, using World War II as a reference point, the states in Europe have been able to experience a prosperous and secure environment as never before. Conversely, choosing the end of the Cold War as a starting point leads to a completely different perception of the situation today and might influence the current security culture in Europe.

The second group of sources refers to the internal political system of a state. It concerns, in an overarching respect, the form of the state and its organization. In other words, security culture is dependent on whether a state is a liberal-democracy, an authoritarian state, or a developing country. Moreover, this group of sources is highly interdependent with history and experience. That is, the length of time in which a state has undergone a certain form of state significantly shapes its security culture. In addition, Howlett mentions the character of a state as “pluralist or dominated by narrow elites.” Features in this group are the organization of the armed forces – for example whether it is organized of professionals or a conscript system – the security administration, as well as the weight of public opinion.⁸⁵

A third group of sources covers geography, which impacts also on the regional balance of power. Howlett mentions the proximity to great powers as one of the most important factors.⁸⁶ In this respect, the geostrategic position, for example, of Germany, has been crucial for the evolution of its security culture. Furthermore, resources lastingly shape the security culture of a state because possession or not of resources might affect how dependent a state is. Similarly, the size of a state itself influences its security culture, since the freedom to maneuver is limited without a certain size and/or resources. In such cases, the tendency to cooperate may be more pronounced.

85. Howlett, “Strategic Culture. Reviewing Recent Literature,” 5.

86. Howlett, “Strategic Culture. Reviewing Recent Literature,” 4.

Finally, a last group of sources influences a security culture from outside of a state.⁸⁷ This is mainly about the involvement of a state in institutions. Following the ideas of the constructivist school of thought, institutions are more than just rational actors and are capable of developing a unique organizational culture.⁸⁸ Generally, constructivists believe that ideas have a significant influence inside an institution. Permanent interaction between members of an institution shapes their perceptions and beliefs. Therefore, institutions could be the vehicle by which a state's security culture is developed, changed, or at least influenced. Constructivists also stress the importance of learning inside an institution. Such a social learning process influences means (simple learning) or even ends (complex learning).⁸⁹ This indicates that inside an institution a collective understanding of security culture might grow. A further consequence of the constructivist school of thought affects the diffusion of norms through an institution. In other words, the spillover of ideas and norms concerning security issues helps to foster a common security culture.

Although the sources of a security culture were catalogued in this chapter, they should not be viewed as isolated but as interdependent. Hence, the security culture of a state is the result of a unique combination of all of these different sources. In addition, myths and symbols have an influence, too, and contribute to the previously mentioned distinctiveness of a security culture.

C. CONCLUSION

This paper treats comprehensive security as a concept that goes beyond the narrow realist state-centric approach. In other words, all of the different theories, concepts, and models, which broaden and widen the notion of security, might be part of a comprehensive understanding of security. Still, security culture

87. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, calls this influence from outside "The International Setting," 16-19.

88. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Tayler, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 94, no. 5 (December 1996): 947.

89. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy. Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," 286.

implies that states act differently despite the fact that they are in similar situations. Hence, both the concept of comprehensive security as well as the idea of security culture challenge realism.

Haftendorn stresses the connection between the concept of security and the different cultures in the security area by stating that “regional variations of security concepts can be explained by different national priorities and the resulting security strategies, which are in part culturally and geopolitically determined.”⁹⁰

This indicates a link between the concepts of comprehensive security and security cultures. According to Haftendorn, the adoption of a specific security concept is, among other reasons, motivated by a distinctive security culture. Security concepts are thus causally linked to security cultures. Diverging security concepts might point to diverging security cultures, and a congruence of security concepts might point to close security cultures. Conversely, the causal effect between comprehensive security and security culture may also be observed in the other direction, that is, from a common concept of comprehensive security to a shared security culture. The adoption of the concept of comprehensive security by many Europeans might thus document, as well as stimulate, a progressive convergence of national security cultures and the emergence of a regional security culture in recent years.

This thesis proceeds generally on the assumption that there is reciprocal interaction between comprehensive security and security culture. However, in particular, the thesis seeks to explain adjustments and modifications in security cultures through the adoption of the notion of comprehensive security. In other words, it is about the effect of a wider and broader understanding of security (comprehensive security) on security culture. The thesis will examine this effect on three different national security concepts: the ones from Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland. The acceptance of comprehensive security will be

90. Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” 13.

especially based on the development of the White Papers of the examined countries. The idea of comprehensive security comprises elements and dimensions that are the same for all states in Europe. For example, environmental problems or migration do not stop at state borders. Intra-state conflicts may cause similar problems everywhere in Europe. In contrast, because there was mainly a narrow focus on security during the Cold War, security cultures could not be influenced by a common approach of comprehensive security.

This thesis seeks to locate changes in security culture in regard to two significant elements: perceptions of multilateralism and the use of force. States differ significantly concerning their dedication to international cooperation and their willingness to use force in international relations. Both components are significantly influenced by diverging security cultures. Multilateralism is close to a comprehensive approach to security. The cooperative thrust of multilateralism goes beyond the realist notion of strict self-help. How a state interacts with others as well as how a state is integrated in formal or informal institutions, in other words its level of multilateralism, says a lot about its security culture.

The use of force, as it is understood in this thesis, includes two different facets. On the one hand, the use of force addresses the question of who or which actor is competent to set out force at all. On the other hand, the use of force concerns the issue of which kind of force is exercised. These may be not only military means, but also economic, diplomatic or other non violent coercive measures. These measures are the result of a comprehensive understanding of security. Alternatively, the different options and the timing for the use of force are indeed also part of the security culture of a state. Perceptions of multilateralism and use of force are, in fact, closely linked. That is, when involved in security institutions, questions as to who may sanction order and which kind of force is applied are not only collectively decided but also framed.

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III. COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS

This chapter presents case studies of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland, respectively. Each case study is divided in two main parts. The first section investigates the comprehensive security approach of the country in question while the second deals with its security culture. The next chapter compares the cases and draws conclusions.

A. GERMANY

The first half of this case study examines, first, Germany's advancement regarding the adoption of comprehensive security in its security documents since the end of the Cold War. Then, in the subsequent part of this first section, the issues of multilateralism and the use of force in the current White Paper of 2006 are evaluated. Second, after a brief overview of Germany's security culture, again in particular concerning multilateralism and the use of force, four main modifications since 1989/1990 will be addressed. In this context, the emergence of the idea of comprehensive security will offer a possible explanation for these adjustments in Germany's security culture.

1. Comprehensive Security

a. *Overview 1989 - 2006*

In Germany, the events of 1989 and 1990 facilitated a transition to a comprehensive approach to security. After the end of the Cold War and reunification of the divided country, security policy changed from a one-dimensional focus on the overwhelming military Soviet threat to a more multidimensional focus, which also incorporated the ideas of regional and global

security.⁹¹ Even in the 1970s, the first approaches to a broader understanding of security in Germany's security policy could be observed. Based on ideas in academic literature, the concept of security was, above all, broadened in regard to economic security.⁹² The White Paper of 1975/1976, although keeping a strong focal point on military security, attempted to include economic aspects.⁹³

The Social Democrats pursued in the 1980s the concept of "cooperative security," which aimed at reducing tensions across the East-West divide and acting on common interests such as the prevention of a nuclear war. Several commonly signed papers with the East German SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Socialistic Unity Party of Germany) were a controversial result of this security concept that deliberately sought to distance itself from what it perceived as an antagonistic East-West confrontational "logic." With Gorbachev's accession to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and his overtures based on "new thinking," those cooperative vectors gained more ground and Germany became a forerunner of disarmament and détente in the Alliance, even to the point of risking open confrontation with the U.S. on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Short Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) "zero options."

Given this receptivity for alternative notions of security, the events of 1989 triggered an enhanced notion of security in Germany. At the end of 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, speaking about the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, used the expression "comprehensive security."⁹⁴ The *Bundeswehr* for the first time began to operate "out of area" (i.e. NATO territory). Engagement of

91. Hans Frank, "Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen," in *Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen. Kompendium zum erweiterten Sicherheitsbegriff*, ed. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (Hamburg: Mittler, 2001), 18.

92. Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7 (2002): 423.

93. Frank, "Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen," 17.

94. Michael Mertes, "German reunification raises the question of democracy," *Financial Times*, December 20, 1989.

minesweepers after the Gulf War in 1991 and participation in the UN missions in Cambodia as well as in Somalia were initial consequences of this extended understanding of security.⁹⁵

Consequently, these ideas of a wider understanding of security were also incorporated in the German White Paper of 1994.⁹⁶ The approach of the 1994 White Paper actually went beyond a narrow realist view of security, stating in the conclusion that "in the future strategic environment, military risk will only be part of a wide spectrum of variables influencing security policy."⁹⁷ Although in public speeches, the preponderance seemed still to lay on the economic broadening of the security, the White Paper of 1994 revealed clearly a broadening also in a social and environmental respect, including the institutionalist notion of interdependence:

Risk analysis of future developments must be based on a broad concept of security. They must not be confined to Europe, but must consider the interdependence of regional and global developments. They must include social and ecological trends and view them in relation to the security of Germany and its allies. In the future, it will be essential to take account of all factors in a comprehensive assessment of the political and strategic situation.⁹⁸

Moreover, German politicians stressed the humanitarian dimension of security as well. For instance, Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping highlighted in 1998 the fight against underdevelopment and for democracy and human rights as part of the German approach to security.⁹⁹ His motivation to contribute German forces to operation Allied Force in Kosovo a year later stemmed very

95. Frank, "Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen," 18.

96. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr* (Federal Ministry of Defense: Bonn, 1994).

97. Frank, "Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen," 18.

98. Ibid., no. 214.

99. *Federal News Service*, "German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping remarks to the Center for Strategic & International Studies regarding German Defense Policy," State Department Briefing, (November 23, 1998).

much from a moral impetus to prevent a “humanitarian catastrophe.” The experience of the Bosnian war had strengthened this humanitarian impulse of German security policy considerably. Two years later, Scharping even stressed that cultural elements might be integrated into the understanding of comprehensive security.¹⁰⁰

Generally, in the 1990s, the idea of comprehensive security became more and more a hallmark of the German security policy. The interventions in Croatia and Bosnia as well as in Kosovo spurred this reorientation, with repercussions also on the practical side of Germany's security policy. In both cases, Germany's interventions were made in cooperation with its allies, which corroborate Germany's cooperative approach towards security since its integration into NATO and EU in the 1950s, signaling Germany's dedication to multilateralism. Moreover, the reasons for the distinctive decisions were driven not only by military considerations but rather humanitarian ones. In this context, the large number of refugees and the financial and social burdens they posed highlighted the risks of intra-state, ethnic wars escalating horizontally, affecting not only regional stability but even the well-being of a seemingly far-away country like Germany. Finally, Germany (due to its traditional restraint in employing military force) placed special emphasis on non-military means to tackle the crises, focusing specifically on diplomatic mediation as well as economic sanctions and incentives.

This development towards a broader understanding of security resonated in the new Defense Policy Guidelines 2003.¹⁰¹ In contrast to the White Papers, which are issued by the Defense Ministry, but need to be approved by the cabinet which is traditionally composed of several coalition partners, the Defense Policy Guidelines are the responsibility of the Federal Minister of Defense alone. In these Policy Guidelines 2003, the comprehensive approach

100. Rudolf Scharping, “A new Roadmap for Germany's Armed Forces; Bundeswehr usage,” *Interavia Business & Technology*, (July 1, 2000).

takes a prominent position. The drafter of these Guidelines, under the influence of the terrorist attacks of 2001, laid emphasis especially on a more detailed threat assessment. In addition, the military was now portrayed as one of the means to counter the new challenges, as the Guidelines stated that

...the political will and ability to enforce or restore freedom and human rights, stability and security with military means, if necessary, are a sine qua non of a credible comprehensive approach to security policy.¹⁰²

To stress that military means are also a part of the extended comprehensive definition of security was a reaction to the rather strong pacifist strand of German politics which tended to neglect this dimension of security and talked about a militarization of German foreign policy because of the increasing willingness of the government to deploy the *Bundeswehr* in UN and NATO missions.¹⁰³ In other words, the Defense Policy Guidelines 2003 explicitly included the military as one of the main instruments of security policy – a fact that might be self-evident in other countries but was controversial in some parts of German society and politics.

Finally, the German White Paper, issued in the fall of 2006, reflects the current German approach towards comprehensive security.¹⁰⁴ Not surprisingly, White Paper 2006 does not change course regarding Germany's concept of security. Instead, this paper consolidates the development of the notion of comprehensive security in Germany. The White Paper refers to the Defense Policy Guidelines of 2003 as well as to the European Security Strategy (ESS)¹⁰⁵ of the same year. Furthermore, White Paper 2006 adds a wider political

101. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *Defence Policy Guidelines* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2003).

102. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, no. 37.

103. Frank, "Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen," 18.

104. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*. (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006).

105. Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*. (Brussels: Europäische Union, 2003).

frame and is therefore a *fortiori*, an inclusive security policy document, which represents the “agreed version of a comprehensive national security concept.”¹⁰⁶

White Paper 2006, itself, declares that “German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security.”¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the concept is explained in detail, starting from a premise that

...the radical changes in the security environment have created new risks and threats that are not only having a destabilizing effect on Germany's immediate surroundings but also impact on the security of the international community as a whole. A successful response to these new challenges requires the application of a wide range of foreign, security, defence, and development policy instruments in order to identify, prevent, and resolve conflicts at an early stage.¹⁰⁸

This explanation of Germany's approach towards security may serve as a concept that goes beyond the traditional realist view of security. This statement in the White Paper demonstrates Germany's comprehensive concept of security. First, by mentioning the international community, the general concept corresponds with Haftendorn's notion of international security. Second, the new threat environment is addressed. Furthermore, globalization, terrorism, proliferation, regional conflicts, illegal arms trade, obstacles to development and fragile statehood, energy security, migration, as well as epidemics and pandemics are listed as challenges and risks.¹⁰⁹ The new element of energy security was especially controversial in the German debate surrounding the concept. Finally, the potential instruments to respond to the threats and challenges are not limited to military means, but also include soft instruments.

106. Detlef Puhl. *The German Defense White Paper*. The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. The Johns Hopkins University <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/puhl010507.aspx> (accessed 5 May 2007).

107. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 6; see also 22.

108. Ibid., 4.

109. Ibid., 17-20.

Besides the broadening of the concept of security in the previously mentioned respects, White Paper 2006 includes components of human, environmental and societal security as well. Regarding human security, White Paper 2006 stresses, for example, poor education, diseases, inequality, or human rights violations as indirect sources for conflicts¹¹⁰ and, hence, as threats to Germany's security. Also, the document states explicitly that Germany is willing to provide security for its citizens.¹¹¹ In addition, contributions to human rights and sustained development are mentioned. These are all clear references to an understanding of security, not only on a state level, but also for individual human beings. Subsequently, White Paper 2006 takes environmental concerns into account as well: natural disasters and environmental destruction are perceived as possible roots for conflicts.¹¹² Finally, by highlighting the responsibility of institutions and elucidating the building of a security community, above all, among European countries, the societal aspect of security entered White Paper 2006.

Not only has White Paper 2006 itself stressed the far reaching approach to security as one of the main pillars of Germany's security concept, but also politicians mention this approach while speaking about Germany's security policy. However, politicians sometimes underline different aspects of the comprehensive approach. For example, Chancellor Angela Merkel pointed out the comprehensive approach after the release of White Paper 2006, stressing the facet of international security.¹¹³ In contrast, Heidi Wegener, a member of the German Parliament, highlighted in addition to this international part, societal and human characteristics of Germany's security policy.¹¹⁴ Accordingly, the

110. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 17.

111. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 15.

112. *Ibid.*, 17.

113. *US Fed News*, "German Security Policy based on Partnership," November 10, 2006.

114. Heidi Wegener, *Sicherheitspolitik im 21. Jahrhundert - Keine allein militärische Aufgabe*. Rede von Heidi Wegener, MdB, am 23.03.2006 im Marshall Center. www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-news-newsbrief/sdocs/mc/news-newsbrief (accessed 9 October 2006).

characteristics of Germany's comprehensive approach to security allow for variation in accent. However, in Germany's concept of comprehensive security, multilateralism and the question of use of force hold prominent positions.

b. Multilateralism and the Use of Force

Particular emphasis in White Paper 2006 is given to "the multilateral orientation of German foreign and security policy."¹¹⁵ The security document dedicates the whole second chapter to German security policy in the international environment, reflecting the strong multilateralist tradition that feeds German foreign and security policy, as it was deliberately designed in the 1950s by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. That chapter reviews the most significant security institutions in which Germany is engaged. Indeed, "a comprehensive security strategy operates through dialogue, cooperation, partnership and institutionalized, rule-based *multilateralism*."¹¹⁶ In contrast to earlier documents, the prominence that is accorded to the European Union (EU) and its strategy is evidence of this advance. In this context, it is important to discern that White Paper 2006 stresses, unequivocally, Europe's character as a community.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, the chapter on security institutions is headed by NATO. NATO itself, organized before 1989 mainly as a collective defense alliance, has been influenced by the comprehensive approach as well and is perceived as an institution which is employed not only in strict military operations but also in preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping missions.¹¹⁸ Although listed after NATO and the EU, the United Nations (UN) plays a pivotal role in Germany's cooperative security structure. The UN should be able to accomplish its tasks and its missions. It is hardly by accident that the White Paper chose the same slogan of "effective multilateralism"¹¹⁹ that is upheld in the ESS.¹²⁰

115. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 24.

116. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power*, 28.

117. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 33.

118. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 121.

119. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 24.

At the same time, the mentioning of the UN is a link to a whole array of questions concerning the authority which is competent to allow the use of force. Germany stresses the importance of the UN, stressing the need for a functioning and enforceable international system, because according to the White Paper all use of force should be authorized by the UN or a regional security organization which is formally recognized by the UN.¹²¹ This requirement is a result of the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 confirming not only that the deployment of German soldiers abroad generally conforms to the Basic Law but that this deployment should always be based on a Security Council mandate.¹²² The UN focus has a further implication as concerns the use of force, namely the choice of instruments used to enforce UN policies and sanctions. As the UN Charter encourages members to employ tools other than military force in international relations, the prominent place of the UN in White Paper 2006 emphasizes Germany's need to provide a set of non-military tools to resolve conflicts.¹²³ White Paper 2006 argues that

German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security. Risks and threats have to be addressed with a suitably matched range of instruments. These include diplomatic, economic, development policy and policing measures as well as military means and, where called for, also armed operations.¹²⁴

This passage reveals three important points about Germany's attitude towards the use of force. First, to tackle risks and threats, different

120. Puhl, *The German Defense White Paper*. The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. The Johns Hopkins University <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/puhl010507.aspx> (accessed 5 May 2007).

121. Ibid.

122. See Nolte, Georg. "Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability," in *Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law*, ed. Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobsen (Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 239-240 about the discussion whether NATO is one of the regional security organizations formally recognized by the UN. The decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court can be found under 1994, BVerfGE (Federal Constitution Court) 90, no. 286, translated in (1994) 106 *International Law Reports* 321.

123. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 49.

124. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 22.

instruments are mentioned. Obviously, not relying solely or even primarily on military means is one of the main characteristics of a comprehensive approach. In particular, the complementarity of civilian and military components was stressed when Security Paper 2006 was released. Chancellor Merkel remarked on this fact while calling for a “unified approach.”¹²⁵ The focus is on civilian measures. The importance of instruments of the civilian side can also be seen in the “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building”¹²⁶ concept of Germany. This concept seeks to combine the diverse civilian instruments in synergy. Second, military means and armed operations are listed separately. Hence, this stands for additional tasks for the military besides armed operations. Third, armed operations have to be called for by the UN or a recognized regional security organization.

In sum, beginning in the 1970s, and accelerating after the end of the cold war, Germany deliberately began adopting traits of comprehensive security in its policy papers as well as in policy implementation. Besides a strong accent on international security, at the beginning, emphasis was laid on an extension to the economic part of security. Soon after, further endorsements in environmental, societal, and human security came into contemplation. Therefore, in the next section, changes in the security culture after 1989, in particular regarding multilateralism and the use of force, are surveyed and the possible roots in the comprehensive approach examined.

2. Security Culture

a. Overview

Germany's current security culture has to be traced back to the end of World War II. After the traumatic past of the totalitarian Nazi regime with its

125. *US Fed News*, “German Security Policy based on Partnership,” November 10, 2006.

126. Bundesregierung, Deutschland, *Action Plan Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building*. http://cms.ifa.de/fileadmin/content/foerderprogramme/zivik/downloads/aktionsplan_volltext_en.pdf (accessed 26 August 2007).

strong unilateral and militaristic approach towards security, the character of Germany's security culture became mainly self restraining and moderate. This "policy of restraint," as it was later called by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, combined with a strong commitment to international institutions, became the hallmark of Germany's foreign and security policy. Subsequent to the end of the Cold War and reunification, Germany's security culture has maintained to a greater or lesser extent those main features. That is, the foreign and security policy of Germany is marked by continuity at a high rate, although many feared a fundamental reorientation after the end of the Cold War.¹²⁷ However, some notable changes did take place. In other words, "the political leadership in government and in the main opposition party supported active adjustment precisely in order to ensure continuity."¹²⁸ Concerning multilateralism and the use of force, the next section will explore the changes which took place without altering Germany's main course in security affairs. At the same time, the adoption of the concept of comprehensive security will be shown to be a reason for these adjustments.

b. Changes in Multilateralism and the Use of Force since 1989 and their Causes

Multilateralism and the use of force are important features when examining Germany's security culture because exactly these parts of Germany's state behavior, from a realist point of view, might have changed significantly after the reunification and the dissolution of the bipolar power balance.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, since the events of 1989 and 1990, there have been no indications of an emerging strong unilateral and militaristic inclination from Germany.

127. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 225.

128. Jeffrey J. Anderson, and John B. Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," in *After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989 - 1991*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 33-34.

129. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War."

The integration of Germany into all the major institutions which were founded after World War II and the proactive role Germany played in them were perceived as a means to regain trust and respect for the new democratic Germany and, thus, readmission into the international community of states.¹³⁰ Moreover, the increasing involvement in institutions during these years has led to a degree of integration, which goes beyond intergovernmentalism and includes ceding national sovereignty, especially at the European level.¹³¹ The supranational first Maastricht pillar of the EU is evidence of this development. At the same time, the strong antimilitarist mood after World War II, including the strong resistance against rearmament and nuclear deterrence, also stimulated Germany's self-conception as a civilian power, which was generally critical of the utility of force.¹³² The strong bonds of multilateral cooperation as well as a pacifist approach to international affairs had a combined effect. Thus, through active participation in several security institutions, Germany has become a reliable partner in security affairs. Furthermore, Germany also received a certain formal and informal amount of influence in these institutions. Hence, wherever Germany has been able to influence decisions of institutions and to determine what instruments to use, it has tried to prevent the use of (military) force, at least as a first reaction. Also, the engagement in arms control negotiations has given Germany the leverage to support non-violent actions.

However, since the end of the Cold War, one might identify adjustments regarding multilateralism and the use of force. With simultaneous consideration of a general continuity in Germany's security culture regarding multilateralism and the use of force, four areas with tendencies towards change might be identified. Because this thesis argues that the adoption of the comprehensive approach in Europe since 1989 might lead to a convergence in a

130. Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," 24.

131. John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 781.

132. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 64.

European security culture, explanations for the adjustments in security culture are based on elements of comprehensive security.

(1) First, one observes a more assertive multilateralism combined with the use of force abroad. Today, Germany has deployed more than 7,300 soldiers outside its own borders. The main contingents are those in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) as well as in Kosovo (Kosovo Force, KFOR).¹³³ All of the nine different operations are under the aegis either of the UN, EU or NATO. Hence, one of the bedrocks of German security culture, the strong reliance on multilateralism and international institutions, is progressing also with its armed forces abroad. However, this more assertive multilateralism, that is, the active participation with military elements, is a development that did not begin until the crises in Yugoslavia and Somalia in the early 1990s. However, even in the 1991 war in Iraq, Germany provided its multilateral duty with financial contributions. From then on, German soldiers were frequently sent abroad under the auspices of international institutions. The use of force abroad, a clear adjustment of the earlier civilian multilateralism, acquired a wide acceptance amongst the German elite. Similarly, pacifist intellectuals consented to this step under certain conditions.¹³⁴ This changing security culture was reflected in a revised interpretation of the German constitution, which was approved by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994.¹³⁵ The public, as well as the media, welcomed the judicial affirmation¹³⁶ and confirmed this new alignment of security culture as a property of a collective. Since then, Germany

133. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung. *Einsatzzahlen - Die Stärke der deutschen Einsatzkontingente*. Data from 9. May 2007. http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4w3dPMHSUGYfvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHR0VFAFIKLis!/_delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzzFQV8xUIA!?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256EF4002AED30%2FW264VFT2439INFODE%2Fcontent.jsp (accessed 14 May 2007).

134. Nolte, "Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability," 235.

135. The decision of the German Federal Constitution Court, 1994, BVerfGE (Federal Constitution Court) 90, no. 286, translated in (1994) 106 *International Law Reports* 321.

136. Nolte, "Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability," 237.

has generally been willing to back civilian processes with use of military force abroad.¹³⁷ However, the use of military force abroad is generally limited to peacekeeping and peace building missions. In this respect, the case of Kosovo is the exception and was domestically debated. Evidence for the preponderance of non-peace enforcement operations is provided by non-participation in the 2003 war in Iraq. Further evidence is offered by the current public opinion about the *Bundeswehr* mission in Afghanistan, where a majority supports deployment in the more peaceful northern part, but dislikes the extension of the mission to the south with reconnaissance aircraft and special forces.¹³⁸

Germany's comprehensive approach to security might serve as explanation for this alignment of security culture. First, as seen, the cooperative approach, that is the willingness to act multilaterally in security affairs, is strongly reflected in Germany's comprehensive concept of security.¹³⁹ Accordingly, Germany has had to take responsibility as a reliable member of the different security institutions in which it is member. In other words, as the security environment after the Cold War asked more for Peace Support Operations (PSO) with military elements, Germany, as an advocate of the institutions that stand behind these operations, had to contribute as well. That is, "Germany has come under growing external pressure to assume greater global responsibility for the promotion and preservation of peace."¹⁴⁰ Second, in contrast to the Cold War, Germany's concept of comprehensive security proceeds also on the assumption that non-state actors can seriously threaten Germany's security. In this context, the societal aspect of comprehensive security shifts away from state actors as well and assumes other actors organized on a societal base organized actors

137. Chancellor Angela Merkel in *US Fed News*, "German Security Policy based on Partnership," November 10, 2006.

138. Infratest dimap. Electoral and political research. <http://www.infratest-dimap.de/?id=39&aid=148> (accessed 14 May 2007) shows a majority of 52% for the engagement generally, but only a minority of 35% welcomes the deployment of Tornado recce aircraft in the southern part of Afghanistan.

139. See Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 24, "German Security policy is committed to effective multilateralism."

140. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 47.

outside traditional state entities. Hence, on the one hand, such collectives might display a threat and have, therefore, to be confronted with military means outside the borders of Germany; on the other hand, societal groups may be groups to protect. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts are examples of such security challenges of non-state actors, which might involve a role for military force.¹⁴¹ Finally, the aspect of human security in Germany's concept of comprehensive security has contributed as well to a more assertive multilateralism and the use of force abroad. For Germany, the military intervention in Bosnia was a pivotal point in declaring the use of force as legitimate in cases of humanitarian crisis.¹⁴²

(2) Second, Germany acts, if necessary, on a more assertive bilateral basis. White Paper 2006 confirms the need for bilateral cooperation and describes this as "a significant element of German security and stability policy."¹⁴³ Germany, though, is keen to prevent tensions in security relations. Therefore, it takes active part in a wide range of multilateral institutions. Selective bilateral action has taken place after 1989; at the beginning with Central and East European states, and after their integration in the EU and NATO, in particular with Russia.¹⁴⁴ One of the more extreme examples of this development was the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991. However, such bilateral (or in the case of Slovenia and Croatia even unilateral) action has generally been backed through institutions. Moreover, bilateral action was often bent on future integration in an institution.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, in this respect, the alignment in Germany's security culture is only a minor one. Nevertheless, one may observe a difference to the time before 1989.

141. BBC Monitoring International Reports, *German Paper Carries Excerpts from Struck's New Defence Policy Guidelines*, June 20, 2003.

142. Nolte, "Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability," 236.

143. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 22-23.

144. Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," 39.

145. Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," 39.

The explanation for this adjustment can be found, again, in Germany's increased comprehensive approach to security after the end of the Cold War. First, the notion of interdependence brought in by the liberal institutionalist school of thought, is a significant element of comprehensive security. With its additional bilateral diplomacy on a selective basis, besides the multinational commitments, Germany corresponds with this element. Second, because, for example, environmental issues are indeed elements of a comprehensive understanding of security, but still often not part of multilateral security institutions, Germany chooses the bilateral way to bridge this gap.¹⁴⁶ Finally, especially in bilateral relations with Russia, energy issues play a significant role. This corresponds clearly with Germany's comprehensive approach to security which includes the question of energy as well.¹⁴⁷

(3) Third, one notices a slow change in the priorities of multilateral security institutions. Regarding security, for Germany before 1989, Europe and the EU stood, besides the primarily economic integration, for a growing inclusive security community among the European states, former enemies in World War II. To be in this community and the strong commitment to it has been deeply entrenched in Germany's security culture. In contrast, NATO was chiefly perceived as a security institution which provided collective defense for its members against enemies from outside of the alliance (even though "keeping the Germans down," in Lord Ismay's wording, was also prevalent). However, after the end of the Cold War, the EU adopted a more robust attitude towards security issues. The formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1993, the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) 1996 as a European Pillar in NATO, the European Security and Defense Policy (EDSP) in 1999 and finally the ESS in 2003 are milestones in the development of a more confident Europe acting increasingly autonomously in military terms.

146. I Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe," 39.

147. Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *White Paper 2006*, 20, "Energy Security."

Germany was, from the beginning, one of the leading advocates for a stronger EU military commitment. Public opinion polls from 2003 reveal that 44 percent of the Germans thought decisions about European security should be made by the EU itself, while only 15 percent preferred NATO.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, a poll from 2006 shows that a vast majority of Germans advocated decision-making regarding security issues on a European level.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, German politicians still stress the importance of NATO and its relevance for Germany's security policy.¹⁵⁰

Germany's comprehensive approach to security offers a possible explanation for this shift in priorities. The comprehensive approach includes the societal aspect. In this connection, Europe is seen as an evolving security community.¹⁵¹ Indeed, the transatlantic multilateral cooperation via NATO, represents a security community as well. However, on the one hand, the security dimension of the EU is rising and offers new perspectives. On the other hand, the dispute over the 2003 Iraq war has called into question one of the main characteristics of a security community, the "shared identities, values and meanings,"¹⁵² between Germany and the main proponent of NATO, the U.S.

(4) Fourth, Germany has implemented a feature to accomplish additional democratic accountability for the use of armed force abroad. The German Constitutional Court, in its judgment in 1994, clarified not only the conditions under which the German Armed Forces are allowed to be deployed but decided also that such a deployment needs the approval of a majority of Members of the German Parliament. Before the end of the Cold War,

148. Alexander Siegschlag, *Die Festlegung der ESVP*. Reader Sicherheitspolitik. http://www.reader-sipo.de/artikel/0409_AIV1.htm (accessed 27 January 2007).

149. European Union. *Public Opinion: The Role of the European Union in Justice, Freedom, and Security Policy area* June-July 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_266_en.pdf (accessed 17 May 2007).

150. Chancellor Angela Merkel in *US Fed News*, "German Security Policy based on Partnership," November 10, 2006.

151. Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power*, 44.

152. Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the study of security communities," 31.

the question about a deployment could not arise, as the interpretation of the German Constitution only allowed participation in operations to defend NATO territory.¹⁵³ However, after the 1991 Iraq war, for which Germany only made financial contributions, the Bundeswehr was deployed in Somalia (UNSOI II) as well as with AWACS reconnaissance flights in Bosnia. These missions were not formally approved by the parliament and were disputed by the opposition, which triggered the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1994. Since then, the parliament has approved all deployments of German troops abroad. Together with general parliamentary oversights, such as a permanent defense committee, an office of a parliamentary ombudsman and budget power, strong parliamentary control of the use of its armed forces has become part of Germany's security culture.¹⁵⁴

Again, the explication for this further feature of German security culture, the approval of the parliament, can be found in the amplified comprehensive approach since 1989. Germany's comprehensive understanding of security entails a high level of commitment to multilateral institutions. This leads to the participation in out-of-area operations. Because such missions go beyond traditional homeland defense, the decisions about deploying forces abroad are always very political. As a result, democratic accountability is to be secured by the say of the parliament. Furthermore, the comprehensive approach highlights the blending between civil and military domains. For example, threats to security may be from civil or military origin or the instruments, which are used to produce security, may come from both sides. Consequently, the right of the parliament strengthens civilian oversight over such operations.

153. Lori F. Damrosch, "Trends in executive and legislative powers," in *Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law*, ed. Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobsen (Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 56.

154. Nolte, "Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability," 242-243 mentions that the Federal Constitutional Court conceived the *Bundeswehr* therefore as a "parliament's army."

3. Conclusion

Since the 1970s, Germany has made hesitant attempts to broaden its understanding of security. This process had been launched primarily by academic scholars and had mainly concerned the economic widening of security. However, the end of the Cold War and subsequent reunification of the two German states enabled the breakthrough of the comprehensive security concept. The various White Papers after 1989/1990 included more and more elements of human, environmental, and societal security. Simultaneously, the policies of the government followed this progress quite closely. The reactions to the wars in the Balkans in the early 1990s are evidence for this development.

Nevertheless, Germany's security culture has been remarkably persistent. Above all, the strong commitment to multilateral actions has remained a hallmark in Germany's security culture. Yet, in the area of multilateralism and the use of force, some adjustments have taken place; although without leaving the general path of continuity. These modifications can be explained by the increasing adoption of comprehensive security notions. One observes chiefly four areas of slight change: First, Germany's multilateralism has become more assertive while using force in out-of-area operations. The more than 7,000 deployed soldiers emphasize this. Second, if necessary, Germany acts also on a bilateral basis, outside multilateral institutions, primarily, with respect to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Third, the ties to European security institutions (CFSP, ESDP) have become closer while the membership in NATO seems to stagnate. Finally, there is a comparably significant amount of democratic accountability when Germany uses its armed forces abroad.

B. GREAT BRITAIN

The Great Britain case study follows the same outline as the one about Germany. The first section details the emergence of the idea of comprehensive security in Great Britain, mainly through examination of security White Papers, and the second section addresses Britain's security culture.

More specifically, the case study will first describe the advent of Britain's understanding of comprehensive security in its security documents since the end of the Cold War. This part ends with a closer look at the issues of multilateralism and the use of force in the current White Paper of 2006. Second, after a general outline of Britain's security culture with a focus on multilateralism and the use of force, four main adjustments in the security culture since 1989/1990 will be addressed. The notion of comprehensive security will serve as an explanation for these adjustments.

1. Comprehensive Security

a. Overview 1989 – 2006

Before 1989, Great Britain's White Paper barely displayed any ideas of comprehensive security. For example, the 1986 White Paper focused chiefly on the challenges presented by the Soviet Union and its military capabilities. However, one can observe two humble approaches towards comprehensive security. On the one hand, the question of collective security was addressed. This was chiefly an effect of Britain's membership in NATO. On the other hand, the threat assessment also included the danger of terrorist attacks.¹⁵⁵ This expansion towards non-state actors was a consequence of the long-standing deployment of the British Army in Northern Ireland. This enlargement to different new categories of threat was also the first main change in the security documents after the end of the Cold War. In other words, a new threat assessment was the basis for the 1990 Defense Review "Options for Change" and the following 1991 Defense White Paper.¹⁵⁶ As a result, the immediate changes after the end of the Cold War towards a more comprehensive approach were made only at a modest level. Nevertheless, at the same time, academics

155. Central Office of Information, London. *Britain's Defence Policy: The 1986 White Paper*. (London: Reference Services, 1986), 1, 7.

156. Louise Richardson, "British State Strategies after the Cold War," in *After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 154.

and politicians stressed the need for a broadening of the concept of security. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher even warned of the threat of global warming.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, the increasing involvement in economic institutions through globalization, a closer relationship to the Continent and new economic options after the collapse of the Soviet Union spilled over to the area of security. However, Great Britain continued to initially define its security policy in a narrow sense. As Louise Richardson observes:

But although emphasis on economic ties and mutual interests arising from interdependence figure prominently in political rhetoric, decision makers clearly did not see such factors as playing a significant role in the definition of security....¹⁵⁸

The calls by academia and politicians for a more comprehensive approach towards security as well as the reality of deployments of the British military in peacekeeping operations finally found resonance in the security documents of the late 1990s. The change from the conservative government to the Labour Party in 1997 was the trigger for this adjustment in Great Britain. In that respect, the 1998 Strategic Defense White Paper¹⁵⁹ marked a radical change in content and language. A direct military attack on the United Kingdom was no longer perceived as a threat. Instead, a new threat - largely environmental - became the primary venue of analysis.

Environmental degradation, ethnic tensions, population pressures, competition for resources, and the collapse of states which may result, also fuel instability and human misery.¹⁶⁰

157. *The Independent*, 26 May 1990, cited in Adelphi Paper. "British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s." Nr. 254. (Oxford: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 28.

158. Richardson, "British State Strategies after the Cold War," 168.

159. Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, *The Strategic Defence Review. White Paper*. (London: House of Commons Library, 1998).

160. Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, *The Strategic Defence Review. White Paper*. (London: House of Commons Library, 1998), 14.

Moreover, the set of tools used to face the new threats was enlarged. For instance, defense diplomacy was introduced as a new defense mission.¹⁶¹ Defense diplomacy was defined as follows:

To provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.¹⁶²

In addition, the 1998 Strategic Defense White Paper was the first security paper of the newly elected Labor government. It strove to institutionalize its new ideas and values. As a result, elements of human security as well as a societal approach found a prominent place in the security document. Accordingly, Prime Minister Blair explained:

Our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end, values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer.¹⁶³

The 2004 Defense White Paper maintained the elements derived from a broader understanding of security. However, in the shadow of the 2001 terror attacks and the following war in Iraq side by side with the U.S., emphasis was placed on the war on terror, and, therefore, a wider threat assessment was

161. Andrew Dorman, *Reconciling Britain to Europe in the next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defence Policy in the post-Cold War Era*. <http://www.Ciaonet.org/isa/doa01/> (accessed 23 July 2007), 5.

162. The Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, *Policy Paper No 1: Defence Diplomacy* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2001), 2.

163. Tony Blair, *Doctrine of International Community*, Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, 22. April 1999, cited in Tim Dunne. *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*. Paper presented to the ISA Annual Conference, Hawaii, 2005. <http://huss.ex.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/dunneValues.doc> (accessed 1 March 2007), 13.

presented. In that view, three main threats stood at the forefront of the document: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and weak and failing states.¹⁶⁴

Finally, the strategy paper released by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 2006, “Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities,”¹⁶⁵ offers a current and comprehensive view of Britain’s security strategy. The paper proceeds on the assumption of a broad approach to security. It addresses issues such as “world economics, population development, environmental aspects, resources and energy problems.”¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, this security paper from the FCO unveils also the so called “Blair Doctrine,” meaning the inclusion of human, democratic, and development values in Britain’s foreign policy.¹⁶⁷ In sum, together with the White Paper from the Ministry of Defense of 2004, Great Britain’s current security documents describe, in detail, an approach to comprehensive security which includes elements of human, environmental, and societal security.

b. Multilateralism and the Use of Force

The 2006 White Paper from the FCO dedicates a whole chapter to the role of Great Britain in the international system.¹⁶⁸ The White Paper attaches great importance to cooperation with other states. The introduction to the

164. Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*. (London: Ministry of Defence, 2004), Foreword by the Secretary of State for Defence the Right Honourable Geoff Hoon MP and 2.

165. Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World. The UK’s International Priorities*. London: Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2006. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile /FCOStrategy FullFinal.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2007).

166. Klaus Hesseling, *Die Britische Sicherheitsstrategie*. http://blog.claushesseling.de/wp-content/uploads/2007/01/Die_Britische_Sicherheitsstrategie.pdf (accessed 27 January 2007).

167. See in particular no 6 of the strategic international priorities in: Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World. The UK’s International Priorities*, 28.

168. Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World. The UK’s International Priorities*, 22-25.

document states that “the international system based on effective multilateral institutions and shared values has long been a cornerstone of British foreign policy.”¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, although emphasis is on multilateral institutions, the FCO White Paper divides its chapter about the role of Great Britain in the international system into the three subchapters “International Organizations,” “European Union,” and “United States.” This division reveals two aspects. First, it shows Great Britain’s view of its position in the world as involving three key relationships: to the U.S. as its main ally, to Europe, and to global organizations. The listing also discloses Britain’s role as a mediator between the U.S. and Europe and its desire for a prominent role in international organizations. Second, the citation of the single bilateral relationship with the U.S. mitigates Great Britain’s commitment to multilateral institutions.

The ramification of this policy also concerns the use of force. When comparing the FCO Paper from 2006 with the White Paper from the Ministry of Defense of 2004, this effect can be observed even more clearly. Where the former mentions that Great Britain will “continue to support an effective system for multilateral co-operation, based *in international law...*,”¹⁷⁰ the latter declares that “...the most demanding operations could only conceivably be undertaken alongside the U.S., either as a NATO operation or a *US led coalition*.”¹⁷¹ In other words, Great Britain’s will to act in a multilateral framework based on international law is not unlimited. For instance, when it comes to efforts against international terrorism, the question of multilateralism is of secondary consideration. The war in Iraq in a coalition outside of an international organization is evidence of this attitude.

With respect to the use of force as an instrument available to tackle the challenges, the British security documents point out the combined use of both

169. Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World. The UK's International Priorities*, 6.

170. *Ibid.*, 22, emphasis added.

171. Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*, 2, emphasis added.

military and civilian tools. In this respect, Secretary of Defense Desmond Browne explained that only the application of all the different means, "diplomacy, economics, military muscle, and development,"¹⁷² will lead to success. One has to add that there are differences between documents from the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. In general, the documents of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office highlight more the multilateral aspect and the commitment to international law.

In sum, during the Cold War, but also after the events of 1989/1990, ideas of a wider understanding of security were barely adopted in Britain's White Papers. However, in the late 1990s, the inclusion of elements of comprehensive security occurred simultaneously and in a broad manner.

2. Security Culture

a. Overview

The security culture of Great Britain from World War II to the present time is marked by its particular position between Europe, the U.S., and Britain's own sphere of influence, the Commonwealth. As a result, one may speak about "three circles of influence,"¹⁷³ which affect British attitudes regarding security issues. Moreover, a further continual pattern of behavior has been the will to play a significant role in the international system. Several conditions have facilitated this special position: the status as a nuclear power; permanent membership in the Security Council of the UN; the pivotal standing in international security organizations such as NATO or OSCE; the role as a mediator on the one hand between Europe and the U.S. and on the other hand

172. Browne Desmond. *Politics and the Art of War*, Speech Secretary of State for Defense Rt. Hon Des Browne MP at Oxford University's 3rd annual lecture for the Oxford-Leverhulme programme on the 'Changing Character of War' on the 9 May 2007. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/PoliticsAndTheArtOfWar.htm> (accessed 24 July 2007).

173. William Wallace, "British Foreign Policy after the Cold War." *International Affairs* 68, no. 3 (July 1992): 427.

(during the Cold War) between the U.S. and the USSR.¹⁷⁴ Britain's security has been primarily dependent on its relationship with the U.S. The so called "special relationship" between Great Britain and the U.S. was established during World War II. It refers generally to a shared identity (basically on a similar culture, language, and history), which has led to common interests and, therefore, to this close relationship.¹⁷⁵ As a second priority, security should be safeguarded on the one hand by NATO and on the other hand by the security institutions of Europe, that is the West European Union (WEU) initially and then the ESDP.

Despite the fact that the international system, and therefore also the "three circles," have changed dramatically since World War II, Great Britain's security culture is marked by continuity. In other words, neither the loss of its Empire (with its climax in 1956 during the Suez crisis), nor the end of the bipolar world along with the reunification of Germany caused a striking change in Britain's security culture. Similarly, the elections of 1997, with the change from a Conservative government to a government of the Labor Party, have not resulted in a prominent change in Britain's security culture, but rather in additional adjustments to it. However, in particular, the events of 1989/1990 have led to a modification in Great Britain's security culture. In this respect, the questions of multilateralism and the use of force are dealt with differently than in the era of the Cold War.

b. Changes in Multilateralism and the Use of Force since 1989 and their Causes

Great Britain's security culture in respect to multilateralism is, first of all, shaped by its particular geographic position. Britain's insular location and the resulting different options concerning cooperation has led to a security culture which is skeptical about unconditional multilateralism. Moreover, Great Britain has always tried to balance every hegemonic aspiration on the European continent. Hence, membership in alliances is not an entrenched idea in Britain's

174. Hesselung, *Die Britische Sicherheitsstrategie*, 65.

175. Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 7-8.

security culture. From the end of World War II on, because of its shrinking influence, Britain's attitude to balancing and to stabilizing the international system has oscillated between a careful multilateralism on European issues and a special, bilateral relationship with the U.S. In addition, despite the decline as an imperial power along with the economic advantage of Germany and France on the European continent, the strong Atlantic relationship enabled Great Britain to hold up its international reputation.¹⁷⁶

However, despite a constant underlying isolationist tendency and the bilateral relationship with the U.S., Great Britain's security culture, as seen regarding Europe, has always had a multilateral facet. Therefore, British decision makers had to take into account the membership of their country in multilateral organizations and the stance of other nations in them.¹⁷⁷ In this respect, NATO has played the most important role for Great Britain, the more so because of the dominant role of the U.S. in NATO.

Furthermore, the membership in international organizations was propelled by increased economic involvement. The accession to the EU in 1973 was a keystone in this advancement. After 1989/1990, increasing globalization, new economic options after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the single market of the EU have all consolidated this outcome. One can observe a spill-over effect from economic issues to security affairs. Great Britain's welcoming of NATO as a more political forum and the rapprochement to a common European defense policy are just two examples of these spill-over effects.¹⁷⁸ Consequently, there have been some adjustments of Britain's security culture in the sphere of multilateralism.

Similarly, modifications have taken place with respect to the use of force. Until the end of the Cold War, Great Britain used force mainly to protect its

176. Wallace, "British Foreign Policy after the Cold War," 427.

177. Richardson, "British State Strategies after the Cold War," 159.

178. Richardson, "British State Strategies after the Cold War," 159.

own interests. Military engagements in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Suez, Aden, Borneo, and the Falklands belonged to this category.¹⁷⁹ Military operations based on a mandate of an international organization were exceptions. In contrast, after 1989/1990, the basis for out-of-area missions broadened. The following four adjustments and their explanations based on comprehensive security illustrate the most relevant ones.

(1) First, Great Britain *increasingly uses force abroad in support of peace missions in a multilateral context, gradually more in order to defend human rights*. This modification in the sphere of security culture has two origins. On the one side, there obviously is an increased willingness to contribute to peacekeeping missions together with other nations. Such missions regularly take place in a multilateral framework. Since the end of the Cold War, Great Britain has become a significant provider of troops for such multilateral peace operations.¹⁸⁰ The operations, in which Great Britain participates, are not limited to traditional peacekeeping. Peace enforcement operations are also part of these engagements. Moreover, state-building is a significant task in these missions.¹⁸¹ As a result, the increased involvement abroad affects not only military means but also further diplomatic and economic instruments. Indeed, Great Britain was also involved in operations abroad before 1989/1990. But these operations served mainly the purpose of colonial possessions and interests and were not part of a peace operation.¹⁸² Therefore, the use of force in support of these interests was exercised by British forces only and not in the context of a multilateral force. The preconditions to allow engagement in multilateral peace operations abroad were

179. List according to; Adelphi Paper. "British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s. 25.

180. Nigel D. White, "The United Kingdom: increasing commitments requires greater parliamentary involvement," in *Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law*, edited by Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobsen (Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 305 and the appropriate Appendix B "Country participation in international operations 1945-2000."

181. Ibid., 305.

182. Examples for these operations are Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Suez, Aden, Borneo, or the Falklands.

one of the first measures taken shortly after the end of the Cold War. Junior Defense Minister Alan Clark was one of the advocates to enhance the "capability for out-of-area operations."¹⁸³

On the other side, one observes a slight change regarding the ends or the aims of out-of-area operations. When the Labor Party came to power in 1997, the so called "Blair Doctrine" was introduced. This doctrine permits the use of force when pursuing "good ends."¹⁸⁴ The NATO campaign in Kosovo was the first implementation of this doctrine. Accordingly, Prime Minister Blair described the intervention in Kosovo "not as a fight for territory, but for values."¹⁸⁵ For Great Britain, the use of force was "a legitimate instrument to use against a state who had been committing egregious human rights violations."¹⁸⁶ The implementation of the "Blair Doctrine" in Kosovo was strongly backed by public opinion. A poll conducted a week after the beginning of the bombings in Kosovo showed an affirmation of 76 percent in contrast to a 16 percent rejection of this kind of use of force. After a month of the air raids, the satisfaction was still at 57 percent, compared with 31 percent dissatisfaction.¹⁸⁷

Great Britain's comprehensive approach towards security may serve as an explanation of this gradual shift in Britain's security culture. The accrued involvements in peace operations and in particular the intervention - also with the use of hard military force¹⁸⁸ - when human rights are violated, show that human security norms indeed are put into practice. To engage in intra-state

183. Adelphi Paper, "*British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s*," 25.

184. Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 2.

185. Tony Blair, cited in Klaus Hesseling. *Die Britische Sicherheitsstrategie*. http://blog.claushesseling.de/wp-content/uploads/2007/01/Die_Britische_Sicherheitsstrategie.pdf (accessed 27 January 2007), 68. See also Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 16.

186. Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 16.

187. Ipsos Mor, Mail on Sunday, Kosovo Poll. <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/1999/ms990402.shtml> (accessed 16 July 2007); Ipsos Mori. Political Attitudes in Great Britain for April 1999. <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/1999/t990426.shtml> (accessed 16 July 2007)

188. Hesseling. *Die Britische Sicherheitsstrategie*, 68.

conflicts, such as Bosnia or Kosovo, in order to prevent the abuse of humanitarian values, goes clearly beyond the traditional notion of a state-centric understanding of security. Moreover, in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the humanitarian intervention took place in favor of certain groups of people. Striving for the security of a particular group of people (e.g. Bosnians, Kosovo-Albanians) reflects norms of societal security, which go beyond a narrow realist approach. In addition, to fight for "good ends" and to be engaged in state building demand the employment not only of the military but also of a full spectrum of civil-military and civil instruments. This group of instruments and their interdependent use is likewise based on a wider understanding of security. Finally, Britain's amplified involvement in multilateral peacekeeping operations has to be seen, as well, from the point of view of possible spill-over effects of conflicts. Violence may harm the economy of Great Britain or cause increased migration. A comprehensive approach towards security acknowledges exactly such threats as deserving attention along with the traditional strictly military threat.

(2) Second, Great Britain *often acts multilaterally, but not necessarily in an institutional framework*. After the Cold War, Great Britain's balancing act between the U.S. and Europe opened the whole spectrum regarding whom to work with in security issues. These days, Britain performs most of its security policies in a bilateral or a multilateral way. Bilaterally, Great Britain works chiefly with its closest ally, the U.S.; nuclear collaboration and sharing intelligence information are two main examples of this bilateral relationship.¹⁸⁹ This special relationship is an entrenched part of Britain's security culture and evidence for this is the enduring character of the relationship despite changes of government on both sides.¹⁹⁰ Institutionally, in the multilateral

189. Gerald Frost, "British Foreign Policy: Dangers and Opportunities in an Era of Uncertainty," in *British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s*, edited by Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1987), 16.

190. Hesselink, *Die Britische Sicherheitsstrategie*, 66, remarks that the Foreign Policy priorities of the new elected Labor government in 1997 did not lead to a change in the special relationship between Great Britain and the U.S.

context, there are several security institutions in which Great Britain adopts a pivotal position: NATO, the UN, EU (CFSP, ESDP), and OSCE belong to this category.

However, since the end of the Cold War, one observes cases in which Britain's multilateral efforts take place outside of institutions. The main example is the current war in Iraq where Great Britain is part of the "coalition of the willing."¹⁹¹ This coalition is a multinational force which has been built beyond the framework of a security institution. The second example is the air campaign in Kosovo. Indeed, the operation was conducted by NATO. Nevertheless, the members of NATO acted without the prior consent of the UN Security Council. Overall, Great Britain's attitude toward acting with partners may be described as "multilateralism a la carte,"¹⁹² meaning that depending on the specific situation, Great Britain acts within or outside of a security institution.

After the change of Prime Minister from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown in the summer of 2007, first tendencies show a lesser commitment to the mission in Iraq. One can observe a more independent British position. The plan to redeploy several hundred British soldiers at the end of 2007 and to generally rethink the situation in Iraq illustrates this tendency.¹⁹³ However, Great Britain remains for the time being the most important partner of the U.S. in the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq.

This modification of Great Britain's security culture can not be explained by the adoption of comprehensive security. In contrast, the comprehensive approach towards security actually calls for institutionalized multilateralism. Consequently, the applied freedom of choice whether to take

191. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mentioned in this context originally that "the mission defines the coalition." (October 2001). Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 7.

192. Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 13.

193. Ben Judah, "Brown sets new course for UK in Iraq." *ISN Security Watch*, 25.9.2007, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18160> (accessed September 27, 2007).

security measures inside or outside an institutional frame is an adjustment in Great Britain's security culture that runs counter to the notion of comprehensive security.

(3) Third, one perceives a *slight change in the relationship to multilateral security institutions*. Out of the "three circles of influence,"¹⁹⁴ Europe, the U.S., and the Commonwealth, only the Atlanticist and the European ones have remained important as concerns security collaboration. The decline of the Empire reduced the impact of the Commonwealth on Great Britain also in security affairs.¹⁹⁵ Regarding security institutions, the Atlanticist and the European circle are represented by NATO and the EU (CFSP\ESDP) respectively. After 1989/1990, on the European side, Great Britain moved closer to its continental allies as never seen before in the period since World War II. The most important step was the rapprochement toward France with the Anglo-French summit in Saint-Malo in 1998. As a direct result, the European Union sanctioned the emergence of ESDP at its summit in Cologne in June 1999. One might sense this process as a "major shift in British security policy."¹⁹⁶ However, Great Britain's ties to NATO and its major ally, the U.S., are still very strong. Indeed, ESDP was specifically designed to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and thus NATO itself. From this point of view, the move towards a European framework of security confirms Britain's determination to maintain an effective NATO and to engage the U.S. in this framework as well. In other words, one identifies Great Britain also in this case as mediator between Europe and the U.S. Moreover, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when some authors predicted the demise of the transatlantic security collaboration,¹⁹⁷ NATO transformed itself into a successful security management institution. Moreover,

194. Wallace, "British Foreign Policy after the Cold War," 427.

195. Paul Rogers, "Reviewing Britain's Security." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 73, no. 4 (October 1997): 655.

196. Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative." *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 34.

197. Wallace, "British Foreign Policy after the Cold War," 424.

after the 2001 terrorist attacks on September 11, one can literally speak of a "resurgent Atlanticist identity which is shaping British foreign policy."¹⁹⁸

As a result, the approximation to the European security structure clearly reveals Britain's particular position between the Atlanticist and the European circle. In other words, there is an area of tension in which the British security culture ranges. Therefore, Great Britain does not decide between one of the security institutions, but rather seeks to use its new position in the European circle to stress commonalities and collaboration. In one of his first speeches, Secretary of State Browne introduced the question of how "NATO and the EU can work better together."¹⁹⁹ In sum, the rapprochement towards the European security structure does not embody new priorities in Britain's security culture. Nevertheless, it is a modification regarding the relationships on both sides of the Atlantic. And in this respect, the relationship to Europe and its security institutions has been strengthened.

The increased implementation of comprehensive security in Great Britain offers possible explanations for the slight rearrangement between the Atlanticist and Europeanist alignment. Britain's rapprochement with the European security structure is a move towards a regional security community. Because many threats of comprehensive security (for example migration, certain environmental issues, intra-state ethnic clashes) may be tackled more effectively by a regional security community, Great Britain has been a chief architect of the new security cooperation within the EU. Interestingly, the last stage of the rapprochement (in particular between France and Great Britain) has been facilitated by the common military engagement in the Balkans, especially in

198. Dunne, *Fighting for Values: Atlanticism, Internationalism and the Blair Doctrine*, 3.

199. Desmond Browne, *NATO and ESDP: Forging new links Speech 8 June 2007*. Speech Secretary of State for Defence Rt. Hon Des Browne MP, for NATO and other EU member states at the Security and Defence Agenda Conference on the 8 June 2007. <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/NatoAndEsdpForgingNewLinksSpeech8June2007.htm> (accessed 18 July 2007)

Bosnia. This engagement was an operation in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis, in other words, an intervention according to the notion of comprehensive security.

(4) Finally, one observes an *increased democratic scrutiny of the parliament in case of the use of force abroad*. In Great Britain, the responsibilities for military engagements are mainly privileges granted to the executive. That is, the government has the most power because of its competence or delegated authority from the Crown.²⁰⁰ There is no mandatory parliamentary approval and even the courts do not have the power to review decisions of the executive regarding the use of force. While engaging troops, even the Cabinet is limited to a War Cabinet with a reduced number of members.²⁰¹ Consequently, the system seems to be one without strong democratic accountability. However, since the end of the Cold War, the parliament has become more involved in decisions about the use of force. Above all, the use of “internationally sanctioned forces in nondefensive actions has brought the tension to a head.”²⁰² As a result, the parliament is pushing for more debate and input about deployments of British Forces. Kosovo and Iraq 2003 are examples of this trend. Obviously, the involvement of the parliament is stronger in combat missions than in peace operations. Hence, when the parliament perceives a mission as more dangerous, it seeks to be more progressively involved.²⁰³ Nevertheless, there is no need for a compulsory parliamentary approval, and the increased involvement of the parliament is simply attributed to an “upward trend in *debate* in parliament.”²⁰⁴

200. Siegschlag, *Die Festlegung der ESVP*, 55.

201. White, "The United Kingdom: increasing commitments requires greater parliamentary involvement," 300-303.

202. Ibid., 300.

203. White, "The United Kingdom: increasing commitments requires greater parliamentary involvement," 309.

204. Ibid., 321.

The explanation for this increased involvement of the parliament is again related to the notion of comprehensive security. First, military deployments to prevent humanitarian crises are perceived as part of a comprehensive understanding of security. Accordingly, a report from the British Foreign Affairs Committee in 2000, after the war in Kosovo, recommended larger parliamentary oversight when conducting such operations, because “the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current customary international law.”²⁰⁵ Second, in operations for reasons other than defense (and therefore part of the comprehensive approach), the possibility of “mission creep” exists. In other words, because of a changing environment, the tasks for the forces deployed can change as well.²⁰⁶ Consequently, there is more need for parliamentary scrutiny not only at the beginning but also during a mission. Third, Britain’s out-of-area deployments have become more comprehensive operations, and therefore involve a large number of civilian instruments in order to support the military. However, the narrow circles of a government, or even a War Cabinet, are not able to take these non-military means adequately into account. Two factors limit the ability of a small government circle to conduct an operation with a comprehensive approach. First, there is the danger of “military professionals dominating the politicians.”²⁰⁷ Second, when only a small War Cabinet is conducting such a mission, there is the danger of tunnel vision which is in particular not wished for in a mission with several civilian, military, and even private actors.²⁰⁸ Hence, the collaboration of the parliament is needed.

205. White, "The United Kingdom: increasing commitments requires greater parliamentary involvement," 317-318.

206. *Ibid.*, 319.

207. Colin Seymour-Ure, "War Cabinets in Limited Wars; Korea, Suez and the Falklands," *Public Administration* 62 (1984): 180-181(1984), cited in White, "The United Kingdom: increasing commitments requires greater parliamentary involvement," 319.

208. White, "The United Kingdom: increasing commitments requires greater parliamentary involvement," 303.

3. Conclusion

Before the end of the Cold War, Great Britain's security documents did not include many elements of comprehensive security. Also after 1989/1990, only subtle changes could be observed; the changes took place chiefly regarding threat assessment, where Britain had had long experience with the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. However, academic scholars, politicians, and finally the change of government in the second half of the 1990s brought almost all parts of comprehensive security into the readjusted security documents. Therefore, regarding the implementation on policy level, one can speak more of an almost instantaneous than a long-evolving change. Since then, in the newly released security documents, the approach to comprehensive security has become more refined. Nevertheless, there are differences between documents from the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. One of the main differences is that the latter is more forthcoming regarding multilateral actions in an institutional frame and the use of force according to international law.

Great Britain's security culture still ranges between its relationship to the U.S., Europe and the Commonwealth. Often, Britain acts as a mediator among these different circles. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, Great Britain has experienced some modifications in its security culture which may be traced back to the adoption of a comprehensive approach towards security. First, Great Britain deploys its military forces more and more as part of international peacekeeping missions. This is distinct from the years before 1989/1990, when British troops mainly were engaged overseas to secure British colonial interests. Second, Great Britain is willing to act on a non-institutional multilateral base, if necessary. Membership in the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq is the main example of this development. Third, Great Britain appears to be moving closer to the emerging European security structures. However, the relationship to NATO and

the U.S. remains strong. Finally, although the executive still has the priority in decisions about military engagements, the parliament has increased its influence in this respect.

Overall, this suggests a mixed conclusion: in some areas the idea of comprehensive security is strongly reflected in changes in the security culture, but in other areas the comprehensive security impulse is limited by continuing Atlanticist elements of Britain's security culture.

C. SWITZERLAND

This third case study follows the same pattern as the preceding ones. A first section will explore the acceptance of comprehensive security in Switzerland's White Papers, and a second section will examine Switzerland's security culture

More specifically, in the first part, a survey of security papers will explain the incremental appearance of comprehensive security in Switzerland's security documents. The approach towards multilateralism and the use of force in the current White Paper of 1999 will be specifically explored. Then, after a generic review of Switzerland's security culture, again with a concentration on multilateralism and the question of the use of force, adjustments in security culture since the end of the Cold War will be presented. The increased emergence of the notion of comprehensive security will function as an explanation for these modifications in Switzerland's security culture.

1. Comprehensive Security

a. Overview 1989 – 2006

Switzerland does not regularly publish White Papers about security. The security documents are released at the discretion of the government and seek to cover at least a mid-term period into the future. As a result, since the end of the Cold War, only two main reports about security were issued: in 1990 and in

1999.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, their titles "Swiss Security Policy in Transition," and "Security through Cooperation," respectively, indicate alterations and changes in Switzerland's security policy after the events of 1989/1990. Furthermore, one may observe a gradual inclusion of comprehensive security in these two security papers.

Switzerland's security reports from the early 1970s already incorporated elements of a broader understanding of security. The conception of a "comprehensive defense" included a wide range of instruments in order to "ensure peace in independence."²¹⁰ However, the focus clearly still rested on a realist military approach to security. For instance, all measures were limited to the territory of Switzerland and the main perceived threat was a military attack on the country. There was a clear distinction between the tasks assigned to the armed forces and the responsibilities assigned to the civilian agencies. This was a consequence of the segregation of security and foreign policy in Switzerland at that time. Humanitarian engagements, good offices, or multilateral cooperation in economic and social questions were treated outside the realm of security. This delineation of responsibility only became mitigated in the mid 1970s, promoted in part by the signature of the "Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" in 1975.²¹¹

An intermediate White Paper in 1979²¹² and two general principles for the armed forces in 1975²¹³ and 1982²¹⁴ did not yet include more elements of

209. Schweizerischer Bundesrat. *Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel. Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz* (Bern, BBL: 1990) (SIPOL B 90); Swiss Federal Council. *Security through Cooperation. Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland* (Bern, BBL: 1999) (SIPOL B 2000).

210. Schweizerischer Bundesrat. *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (Konzeption der Gesamtverteidigung)* (Bern, BBL: 1973) (Report 73), 6.

211. Jon A Fanzun and Patrick Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt." In: *CSS Zuerich Contributions to Security Policy No. 57*, ed. Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger (Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2000), 71.

212. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Zwischenbericht zur Sicherheitspolitik* (Bern, BBL: 1979).

comprehensive security and did not yet completely close the gap between security and foreign policy. One exception was the mentioning of an economic threat.²¹⁵ This exception can be directly attributed to the 1973 oil crisis and the following recession as well as Switzerland's dependence on raw materials.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Swiss Federal Council issued a White Paper entitled "Swiss Security Policy in Transition" (SIPOL B 90). This document recognized the dimensions of the events in 1989/1990 and marked the first change towards a broader, more comprehensive approach to security. Security was no longer perceived as a purely military affair. Moreover, the report also stated that an autonomous preservation of security was not possible anymore.²¹⁶ Consequently, SIPOL B 90, with its wider understanding of security, was actually a comprehensive security document.²¹⁷ When taking into account the breathtaking pace of the events in 1989 and 1990, the issuance of SIPOL B 90 was a remarkable effort with such a new and clearly different approach to security so shortly after the demise of the bipolar world.²¹⁸

The two main aspects of comprehensive security that can be found in the report were the acknowledgement of new threats and the emphasis on multilateral cooperation in security issues. Regarding the threats, SIPOL B 90 concluded:

213. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung ueber das Leitbild der militaerischen Landesverteidigung in den achtyger Jahren (Armeeleitbild 80)* (Bern, BBL: 1975).

214. Eidgenoessisches Militaerdepartement, *Bericht des Eidgenoessischen Militaerdepartement ueber das Armeeleitbild und den Ausbauschritt 1984-1987.* (Bern, BBL: 1975).

215. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Zwischenbericht zur Sicherheitspolitik.* Bern, BBL: 1979, 8.

216. Andreas Wenger, "Herausforderung Sicherheit: Eine Beurteilung der sicherheitspolitischen Grundlagen der Schweiz mit Blick auf die Zukunft." In: *Bulletin 2005 zur Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Andreas Wenger (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik, 2005), 11

217. Kurt R. Spillmann, "Von der bewaffneten Neutralität zur kooperativen Sicherheit." In: *Bulletin 1995 zur Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, ed Kurt R. Spillmann. (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik, 1995), 10.

218. Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Marcel Gerber. *Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945* (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 2001), 159.

Worldwide, it becomes increasingly manifest that there are further dangers which can at least threaten the existence of the state and the population. Their reasons are to be found in demographic, environmental, economic, and societal developments.²¹⁹

Consequently, an effect of this comprehensive understanding of security was the inclusion of the “protection of the population and its natural resources” and “a contribution to the international stability, above all in Europe” as security policy targets.²²⁰ These are referred to as “geographic and content-oriented expansion of the risk spectrum.”²²¹

Overall, the report from 1990 was the starting point for the transition from an autonomous to a more cooperatively oriented security policy. Furthermore, it was generally a change to a broader understanding of security, most notably due to a wider understanding of the threat spectrum. However, despite the fact that the armed forces received the task of “promotion of peace,” its essence was still focused on the prevention of war through defense preparedness.²²²

Finally, the 1999 White Paper (SIPOL B 2000)²²³, the most current security document, offers an even more comprehensive approach towards security. Three reasons account for this further step in Switzerland’s security documents. First, in the mid 1990s, Switzerland played a very active role in the OSCE (until the 1995 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe - CSCE) with the climax of the OSCE presidency in 1996. The OSCE itself is designed as an institution with a comprehensive agenda, including issues such

219. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *SIPOL B 90*, 851; translated by author.

220. *Ibid.*, 873. The other targets were: „Peace in Freedom and Independence, Ensuring freedom of action, and maintenance of the Swiss territory.”

221. Andreas Wenger and Daniel Trachsler, "Bewaffnete Teilnahme an Friedensoperationen - Schlüssel für die Umsetzung von "Sicherheit durch Kooperation" und Armee XXI." In: *Bulletin 2001 zur Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Kurt R. Spillmann and Andreas Wenger (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik, 2001), 15.

222. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *SIPOL B 90*, 875, 877; see also Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt," 76.

223. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000.

as security, economy, human rights, confidence-building, and preventive diplomacy. The active role while holding the OSCE presidency had a spillover effect into Switzerland's domestic security policy. As a result, security and foreign policy became even more entwined and this has facilitated a more comprehensive approach towards security. Second, a study group appointed in 1998 by the Federal Council of the Department of Defense, with former ambassador Edouard Brunner as its leader, came to the conclusion that only an enhanced cooperation with Switzerland's neighbors as well as with the Atlantic and European security institutions would guarantee the security of the country.²²⁴ The participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1996 anticipated the recommendations of the study group. Third, the war in Kosovo and the following migration movements also proved that conflicts outside of the country can have an impact on Switzerland.²²⁵

As a result, SIPOL B 2000 was named "Security through Cooperation" with two main efforts:

On the one hand, it concerns the comprehensive but compared to the past more flexible, cooperation between all civilian and military assets serving our interests in security policy....On the other hand is an enhanced collaboration with international security organizations and friendly states in order to contribute, through mutually reinforcing co-operation, to stability and peace in our extended geographic sphere.²²⁶

Furthermore, among the listed risks and opportunities, "Economic, social and ecological developments," "Demographic developments, migration," or "Natural and man/made disasters," also indicate the comprehensive character of SIPOL B 2000.²²⁷

224. Brunner Commission, *Report of the Study Commission on Strategic Issues* (Bern, BBL: 1998) http://www.ssn.ethz.ch/forschung/amt/berichtbrunner_e.htm (accessed 2 Aug 2007), 1.

225. Wenger and Trachsler, "Bewaffnete Teilnahme an Friedensoperationen - Schlüssel für die Umsetzung von "Sicherheit durch Kooperation" und Armee XXI," 23.

226. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000, 1.

227. Ibid., 8-16.

In sum, before the end of the Cold War, though Switzerland was active in humanitarian relief operations, good services, or multilateral cooperation in economic and social areas, the security documents strongly differentiated between security and foreign policy, as well as military and civilian instruments. As a result, the security reports were chiefly based on a narrow and military-oriented approach towards security. Shortly after the events of 1989/1990, SIPOL B 90 included a wider threat assessment and moved into the direction of more multilateral cooperation, including interagency on the domestic level. However, SIPOL 90 was still characterized by an adherence to a state-centric definition of security.²²⁸ SIPOL B 2000 further developed the idea of a wider threat spectrum and the need for more cooperation, moving away from a state-centered understanding of security. In addition, SIPOL B 2000 includes an even greater focus on the interdependence of security and foreign policy instruments.

b. *Multilateralism and the Use of Force*

The title of SIPOL B 2000 “Security through Cooperation” refers, on the one hand, to the collaboration of domestic military and civilian instruments, and, on the other hand, to the intention to work together with international partners. The latter is “not just an expression of solidarity, but a significant element of our [Switzerland’s] security policy serving our own interests.”²²⁹ Regarding international cooperation, the SIPOL B 2000 security report lists the various international security institutions in which Switzerland is a member or which influence Switzerland’s position in the international system.²³⁰ Interestingly, the numeration starts with the UN, an institution in which Switzerland was not a member at the time of the issuance of the security report. Switzerland joined the UN as a full member in 2002. Nevertheless, the citation of the UN at such a

228. Spillmann et. al, *Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945*, 203.

229. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000, 7.

230. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000, 16-24.

prominent place is justified by the fact that Switzerland took part in several programs and funds of the UN before 2002.²³¹

SIPOL B 2000 also mentions the limitation of Switzerland's security cooperation:

The limits of our security cooperation are set by two factors. A prerequisite for Swiss participation is that any peace support operation must have a clear legitimacy in international law (normally a UN Security Council or an OSCE mandate). In addition, the restrictions ensuing from the law of neutrality have to be observed.²³²

In this context, since 1993, the Swiss Federal Council has taken the view that economic measures of coercion by the UN antecede the law of neutrality. Still, this attitude is not directly applicable to military measures of coercion. In this case, neutrality is kept in reserve.²³³

The limits of security cooperation also concern the use of force abroad. The detailed limitations and preconditions for the use of (military) force abroad are specified in Swiss military law. Along with the mandate of the UN Security Council or the OSCE, there are three further conditions. First, the mission has to be in accordance with Swiss foreign and security policy. Second, the participating military personnel have to be volunteers, and appropriate training has to be accomplished before the mission. And finally, Swiss troops are not allowed to perform peace enforcement.²³⁴

Concerning the second meaning of the use of force, the different instruments that will be engaged, SIPOL B 2000 declares, on a strategic level, foreign policy, the armed forces, civil protection, economic policy, national

231. See also: Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt," 237.

232. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000, 35.

233. Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt," 79.

234. Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft. *Bundesgesetz ueber die Armee and die Militaerverwaltung (Militaergesetz, MG) vom 3. Februar 1995 (Stand am 1. Mai 2007)*. <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/5/510.10.de.pdf> (accessed 3 Aug 2007), Art. 66 and Art 66a. For the competences, see below in the next section.

economic supply, protection of the constitutional order and police, and information and communication as the main tools. This has two different consequences, one for internal and one for external security. First, the instruments are to be used interdependently, and they refer to “security through cooperation” in the sense of a more flexible collaboration of all the available instruments for internal security. Second, it shows the current rapprochement of foreign and security policy. Consequently, the report argues that “the end of the Cold War has significantly increased the importance of foreign policy as a factor in our security policy.”²³⁵

In sum, during the Cold War, although several elements of a wider understanding of security were already implemented, the separation of foreign and security policy prevented a clear and comprehensive approach to security issues. However, after the end of the bipolar world, ideas of comprehensive security have rapidly emerged in Switzerland’s White Papers.

2. Security Culture

a. Overview

Switzerland’s security culture is based mainly on the precepts of neutrality and independence. These principles may be traced back in the country’s history, being a small state in an environment of bigger and more powerful neighbors. Being quiet and not interfering with the belligerence of other countries was seen as “the safest policy to maintain security.”²³⁶ The fact that Switzerland was not attacked in World War II consolidated this attitude. Consequently, during the Cold War, the notion of neutrality became even more entrenched in the security culture of Switzerland.

However, neutrality has three different functions in the case of Switzerland. First, there is a function regarding *security*. Neutrality signifies that

235. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000, 39.

236. Spillmann, "Von der bewaffneten Neutralität zur kooperativen Sicherheit," 2.

Switzerland tries to stand generally aloof of international conflicts. Second, but it also implies *solidarity*, especially offering good offices to alleviate conflicts. Third, neutrality has also an *integration* function. This means that neutrality is closely associated with Switzerland's conception and idea of its state.

It was neutrality's function regarding security which was most strongly maintained in Swiss policy. In a more general approach including foreign policy, Switzerland used the flexibility of its neutrality in several ways. First, Switzerland also used the special position of a neutral country to offer good offices in conflicts. Second, the country joined institutions, such as the European Free Trade Association in 1961 and the Council of Europe in 1963. This double track attitude was named "neutrality and solidarity." After the end of the Cold War, the general attitude towards neutrality did not change much. Surveys of public opinion reveal a high and stable support of neutrality. Between 1993 and 2006, the preservation of neutrality was always backed by 79 percent to 90 percent.²³⁷ However, one has to take into account that neutrality comprises the above mentioned different functions. Neutrality's functions of solidarity and identity enjoy public confidence on a similar level as the general acceptance of neutrality. In contrast, neutrality's function regarding security policy has changed since the end of the Cold War and has ranged around 50 percent since 1993.²³⁸

The views of the political elites correspond to the figures of public opinion. That is, neutrality as a general value is supported by politicians of almost all important parties. However, neutrality in the realm of security policy is controversial. Above all, politicians on the conservative side of the political spectrum advocate strict neutrality in security issues. The minister for Justice and Police, Christoph Blocher, formulated this opinion in 2004 when stating that

237. Karl W. Haltiner and Andreas Wenger (ed). "Sicherheit 2006: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend. (Zurich: Forschungsstelle fuer Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zuerich und Militaerakademie an der ETH Zuerich, 2006), 98.

238. Haltiner Wenger (ed), "Sicherheit 2006: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend, 100 – 104, between 1993 and 2006, acceptance between 84% and 89% for the neutrality function of solidarity and between 67% and 81% for the neutrality function of identity.

“neutrality protects the small one because he does not get involved in the power struggles of the powerful.”²³⁹ On the other side, politicians and parties of the center advocate a more pragmatic approach to neutrality in security issues. For example, the Free Democratic Party explained in 2007 that Switzerland should more strongly follow the notion of “security through cooperation.”²⁴⁰

b. Changes in Multilateralism and the Use of Force since 1989 and their Causes

Until the end of the cold war, Switzerland’s cooperation in security issues was limited to institutions where neutrality was guaranteed and where the institutions did not make decisions but only recommendations. The CSCE was a typical forum in which Switzerland could satisfy these prerequisites. Nevertheless, although cooperation was restricted, the country shared core values with other western democracies.²⁴¹ After the events of 1989/1990 and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the immediate threat disappeared. Consequently, Switzerland began to incorporate the idea that increased multinational cooperation was possible without the abandonment of neutrality. Recent referendums about increased cooperation in security issues confirm this course.²⁴² During the Cold War, neutrality was not only responsible for a “reluctant cooperation in multinational institutions, but also for restraining direct engagement abroad.”²⁴³ Consequently, the determination of the use of force is also dependent upon the concept of neutrality. Still, as in the more

239.. Neue Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag, November 11, 2004, cited in: Jan Metzger and Jan-Philip Kessler. “Homeland Security in Switzerland.” In: *Protecting the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal Security – Implications for the United States*, edited by Hamilton, Daniel, Bengt Sundelius and Jesper Groenvall (Washington D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005), 105.

240.. *Basler Zeitung*, “FDP setzt sich für starke und moderne Armee ein.” August 6, 2007. <http://www.baz.ch/news/index.cfm?ObjectID=3B8E8605-1422-0CEF-70D8BAE116EDF984> (accessed August 6, 2007)

241. Spillmann, "Von der bewaffneten Neutralität zur kooperativen Sicherheit," 8.

242. Above all the referendum about armed participation of Swiss troops abroad (2001), the referendum about the accession to the United Nations (2002), and the new Swiss military law (2003).

243. Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt," 79.

flexible part of foreign policy during the Cold War, most of the instruments used were of a soft power character. However, the use of military power abroad has increased incrementally since 1989. Thus, one may clearly identify modifications in the attitude towards multilateralism and the use of force. The following four main adjustments can be explained by the adoption of a more comprehensive approach towards security.

(1) First, Switzerland *increasingly deploys armed forces abroad in support of peace missions*. During the Cold War, Switzerland's contribution to international peace support was limited to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea and, through the participation in several programs and funds of the UN, to logistical and financial support of UN peacekeeping missions. These humble contributions changed after 1989. The first deployment was a Medical Unit to Namibia in 1989/1990 and then from 1990 on, UN military observers in several countries.²⁴⁴ The next contribution was the deployment of a Headquarter Support Unit to Bosnia in 1996. In 1999, the Federal Council decided to participate with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), based on UN Resolution 1244. This mission is still the main example of Switzerland's contribution to international peace support missions. The deployment of Swiss officers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003 and the participation in the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia are the most recent deployments. Currently, 284 Swiss military personnel are deployed in peace support operations abroad.²⁴⁵

Not only has the quantity of the deployments abroad increased, but one also observes two changes in the quality of the peace support

244. See for current figures: SWISSINT. *Factsheet Internationale Personaleinsaetze der Armee*. Data from August 2007. http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/peace.ContentPar.0048.DownloadFile.tmp/Factsheet%20PeaceSupport_d.pdf (accessed 8 august 2007)

245. SWISSINT, Schweizerische Militärpersonen und EDA-Personal in friedensunterstützenden Auslandseinsätzen. *Swiss Peace Supporter 3* (September 2007).http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/peace/laufende/peace_support_allgemein/magazin_swiss_peace.ContentPar.0001.DownloadFile.tmp/Swiss_Peace_Supporter_03_07.pdf (accessed 10 October 2007).

missions in which Switzerland takes part. First, there is an increased willingness to participate in more delicate operations. The advancement from Medical Units or UN military observers to Infantry troops in Kosovo or the deployment of personnel to Afghanistan mark this trend. Second, in connection with this, since a 2001 referendum about the Swiss military law, Swiss Contingents abroad can be now armed. This was an important step towards a more assertive participation in peace support missions. However, Swiss military law also clearly states that peace enforcement missions abroad are not possible.²⁴⁶

Public opinion encouraged this increased deployment of troops abroad. In a 2006 survey, 78 percent of respondents advocated missions abroad. Public opinion is also more in favor of armed deployments (for self protection) versus deployments without arms (47 percent towards 31 percent). Possible peace enforcement is only backed by 5 percent.²⁴⁷ The Federal Council and the Swiss parliament pursue a policy that reflects this prevailing public opinion. In a speech before the referendum about the Swiss military law, and therefore about the armament of troops abroad, Defense Minister Samuel Schmid confirmed the government's policy to send military personnel abroad but not for peace enforcement.²⁴⁸

The increased acceptance of a comprehensive approach towards security in Switzerland may explain this development regarding the increased missions abroad. First, the preparedness for cooperation in security issues is one of the main pillars of Switzerland's comprehensive understanding of security after the end of the Cold War. The increased involvement in peace support missions is a consequence of this greater acceptance of multilateral operations. Moreover, the confluence of security policy and foreign policy, a

246. Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, *Bundesgesetz ueber die Armee and die Militaerverwaltung (Militaergesetz, MG)* vom 3. Februar 1995, Art. 66a.

247. Haltiner Wenger (ed), "Sicherheit 2006: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend, 92.

248. Schmid, Samuel, "Bekenntnis zu KMU und Militaergesetz." *Berner KMU Magazin Mai 2001 Interavia Business & Technology*, July 1, 2000. http://www.bernerkmu.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Inhalte/kmu-magazin/2001/ 05-01kmu5_bekenntnis.pdf (accessed 8 August 2007)

further important integration that has led to a more comprehensive approach towards security, has also contributed to the willingness of supporting international missions. Second, societal threats, such as migration, are now perceived as a security risk. The events during the wars on the Balkans with migration movements throughout all of Europe and the rise of asylum seekers confirmed that Switzerland is no longer “an island of security.”²⁴⁹ The main focus of Switzerland’s effort in peace support is consequently the Balkans.

(2) Second, Switzerland *acts mostly in an institutional and multilateral way, but still keeps bilateral options outside institutions open*. Since the end of the Cold War, Switzerland acts in security issues more on a multilateral and institutional basis.²⁵⁰ However, the bilateral and also non-institutionalized approach is still an option for Switzerland. Additionally, SIPOL B 2000 explains that “Switzerland uses every opportunity for *bilateral* cooperation with friendly states and armed forces.”²⁵¹ This independent attitude outside of the institutional and multilateral framework is still an element of Switzerland’s security culture. Sometimes, the bilateral approach is the only legal option because of neutrality or other constraints that do not allow for institutional membership and multilateral behavior. For example, it is not possible to make contributions to the EU Battle Groups, which are permitted to be active throughout the whole spectrum of crisis management,²⁵² because peace enforcement is not allowed. Current examples of bilateral treaties include those with Germany, France, and Italy to safeguard the airspace during the European soccer Championship in 2008.²⁵³

249. Wenger and Trachsler, “Bewaffnete Teilnahme an Friedensoperationen - Schlüssel für die Umsetzung von “Sicherheit durch Kooperation” und Armee XXI,” 23.

250. See more in the next subchapter (3).

251. Swiss Federal Council, SIPOL B 2000, 35.

252. These are the so called “Petersberg tasks.”. Reciding to the Western European Union (WEU) and then incorporated in the EU treaties and ESDP, they define the whole range of tasks in peace keeping missions from humanitarian aid until peace enforcement.

253. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, “Luftraumsicherung als strategische Aufgabe,” May 10, 2007. Schweizer Armee.

Switzerland's more comprehensive approach to security may interestingly offer some explanation for bilateral and non-institutional action. One of the main features of comprehensive security in Switzerland is the convergence of foreign and security policy. As a result, the stress of an autonomous foreign policy (for example with regard to good offices) has also affected the area of security policy. This interdependence of foreign and security policy has brought some foreign policy restrictions to Switzerland's security policy. Hence, acting bilaterally outside of multilateral institutions is sometimes the only practical solution. Furthermore, certain bilateral treaties, in arms control for instance, may serve as examples for future agreements in a multilateral framework. In this respect, the comprehensive notion of security may also be mentioned as a reason for bilateral action.

(3) Third, Switzerland *is increasingly willing to accede multilateral security institutions*. Before the end of the Cold War, the OSCE was the only institution with a security agenda in which Switzerland held membership. However, the changes in 1989/1990 with the emergence of new threats and risks have led to a modification of Switzerland's security culture. The two main security institutions Switzerland has joined are Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1996 and the UN in 2002. However, Switzerland is not a member of the two most important security institutions in Europe: NATO and the EU (ESDP).

Membership in PfP also includes participation in the European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as well as the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Participation in PfP has increased since 1996²⁵⁴ and the PfP membership has become normalized within Swiss security policy. Nevertheless, the core of Switzerland's security culture, neutrality, is not affected by PfP membership. Switzerland's membership document for PfP clearly states that "all activities [of PfP] in which Switzerland takes part, have to be compatible

254. Schweizer Armee, *Schweizer Armee in PfP*. <http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/partnerschaft0/armee.html> (accessed 9 August 2007)

with its neutrality.”²⁵⁵ Consequently, PfP membership is a good example of Switzerland’s cooperative security culture since the end of the Cold War. Cooperation is seen as necessary, solidary and accountable for Switzerland’s security, yet still limited by the principles of neutrality and independence.

Only in 2002, after a referendum in the same year, did Switzerland become a member of the UN. In 1986, a former referendum for accession to the UN did not pass. In other words, the increased willingness after the end of the Cold War to cooperate in multilateral institutions facilitated the domestic support of UN membership.

The increased implementation of comprehensive security in Switzerland offers possible explanations for the increased participation in security institutions. First, the convergence of security policy and foreign policy, one of the main parts of Switzerland’s understanding of comprehensive security, facilitated the new memberships. Second, both security institutions represent ideas and values that are part of Switzerland’s understanding of comprehensive security. For example, the UN is committed to the notion of human security, an important part of comprehensive security in Switzerland. Moreover, the values behind PfP, “stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, protection and promotion of basic and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy”²⁵⁶ correspond with Switzerland’s comprehensive approach to security.

(4) Finally, Switzerland has implemented *measures to limit the use of force abroad and to guarantee additional democratic accountability for the use of armed force abroad*. The direct democracy in Switzerland has always

255. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, *Praesentationsdokument der Schweiz fuer die Partnerschaft fuer den Frieden vom 30.10.1996*. <http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/partnerschaft0/grundlagendokumente.ContentPar.0006.DownloadFile.tmp/Präsentationsdokument%20der%20Schweiz.pdf> (accessed 9 August 2007)

256. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, *Rahmendokument PfP*. <http://www.vtg.admin.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/partnerschaft0/grundlagendokumente.ContentPar.0005.DownloadFile.tmp/Einladung-Partnerschaft%20für%20den%20Frieden.pdf> (accessed 10 August 2007)

given the possibility to demand a poll about security issues. However, the quantity of ballots has increased since the end of the Cold War. There were nine referendums about security topics, and four of them were related to the use of force abroad.²⁵⁷

In general, the Federal Council is authorized to deploy Swiss military personnel.²⁵⁸ However, there are two additional requirements. First, if the mission is executed with arms, the Federal Council has first to consult the Foreign and the Security Committee of the Parliament. Second, if there are more than a hundred military personnel who are sent abroad, or if the mission is longer than three weeks, the Parliament has to approve the deployment with a simple majority. Besides these domestic prerequisites, a further requirement for the deployment of Swiss troops abroad is a UN or an OSCE mandate.

The implementation of comprehensive security is related to the increase in security-related referendums. The question of the use of force abroad could only have evolved through this broader understanding of security. This understanding goes beyond the notion that the country's security is limited to the defense of its own territory. The convergence of security and foreign policy has caused the use of force abroad to receive more attention from the public.

The additional requirement of a UN or OSCE mandate is equally an outcome of the notion of comprehensive security. These institutions are the only legitimate agencies which are authorized to marshal the use of force. This reliance on collective security also stems from the comprehensive approach towards security.

257. See Karl W. Haltiner, *Tradition as political value – The public image of security, defense, and military in Switzerland*. Zurich: Paper presented at the 5th International Security Forum (ISF), 14-16 October 2002, Zurich. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/5isf/5/Papers/Haltiner_paper_V-3.pdf (accessed 10 August 2007)

258. Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, *Bundesgesetz ueber die Armee and die Militaerverwaltung (Militaergesetz, MG)* vom 3. Februar 1995, Art. 66a.

3. Conclusion

In the 1970s, with the conception of "comprehensive defense," Switzerland conceptualized a wide range of instruments to allow for the defense of the country. However, foreign and security policy were considered two separate disciplines and the focus lay on a realist military approach to security. The first White Paper after the end of the Cold War in 1990 marked the starting point for a more comprehensive approach to security. It was above all about the convergence of foreign and security policy and the transition from an autonomous to a cooperative security policy. The current White Paper from 1999 with the title "Security through Cooperation" confirmed this development.

Switzerland's security culture is still dominated by the notion of neutrality. Yet, neutrality no longer precludes cooperation in security issues with partners in or outside of institutions. Therefore, in the area of multilateralism and the use of force, one can observe modifications of Switzerland's security culture. First, Switzerland increasingly deploys armed forces abroad in support of peace missions. Moreover, over the course of time, Swiss military personnel have been deployed on increasingly robust missions. The acceptance of armed missions was a decisive step in this advancement. Second, Switzerland primarily acts in an institutional and multilateral framework in security issues. However, the offering of good offices or the limits imposed by neutrality also require the use of bilateral action. Third, Switzerland has become a member of PfP and the UN. In both institutions, the country is very active. Finally, questions about the use of force abroad are increasingly topics of polls. In addition, although the Federal Council is authorized to deploy Swiss military personnel, the parliament gets involved in cases of longer or larger contingents abroad. Hence, the overall influence of comprehensive security on Swiss security culture has been extensive.

This chapter has examined evidence that a notion of comprehensive security has influenced the security cultures of Germany, Great Britain, and

Switzerland, taken separately. The next, concluding chapter compares the findings of the three case studies and uses these findings to answer the question of whether a common European security culture is emerging.

IV. CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, the adoption of a broader and wider understanding of security has taken place in Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland. Today, although emphasis is placed differently, one may speak of a similar comprehensive approach to security in the three examined countries.

Yet, the development to such a comprehensive approach proceeded in a dissimilar progression. Germany, in the 1970s, had already embraced a wider definition of security. That definition consisted of two different paths, an economic one, and, mainly supported by Social Democrats, a cooperative one. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany facilitated the adoption of comprehensive security, both in Germany's White Papers and in its policies. This development occurred swiftly and continued steadily.²⁵⁹ In contrast, before the end of the Cold War, Great Britain barely incorporated ideas of a wider understanding of security. Furthermore, Britain's rapprochement towards comprehensive security was not propelled by the events of 1989\1990. In fact, only in the late 1990s, were the main elements of comprehensive security incorporated into Great Britain's security policies. However, this adoption occurred swiftly and in a broad manner. Finally, in Switzerland, for a long time, the separation of foreign and security policy prevented a clear and comprehensive approach to security issues. Yet, since shortly after the demise of the bipolar world, ideas of comprehensive security have been absorbed incrementally in White Papers and in Switzerland's security policy.

This thesis finds that this incorporation of comprehensive security, both in White Papers and policies, has had a decisive impact on the security cultures of the three countries. Because they followed diverse paths, their security cultures have been influenced in different ways and at different moments. However, as

259. Frank, "Sicherheitspolitik in neuen Dimensionen," 94.

there is a reciprocal relationship between the adoption of comprehensive security and security culture, a convergence in both areas can be observed. Yet, "new security concepts and, in particular, innovative approaches towards the use of force, are slow in emerging."²⁶⁰ Consequently, changes in security culture usually occur as incremental adjustments and modifications; extreme turnarounds following political shocks are rare.²⁶¹ Nevertheless, because all the three studied countries, Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland, although in separate ways, incorporated the idea of a comprehensive approach towards security, a convergence of their respective security cultures is clearly visible.

This thesis follows the method of a structured, focused comparison.²⁶² Therefore, the case studies concentrated on four questions, all of them in the area of multilateralism and the use of force. At this place, a comparison is possible. The findings with respect to each question are summarized in the four sections that follow, respectively:

(1) *What are the modifications regarding the use of force abroad?* In this area one observes distinct modifications of the security culture in all three countries since the end of the Cold War. Germany pursues a more assertive multilateralism and backs civilian processes abroad with the use of military force. This adjustment of Germany's security culture became visible in the early 1990s with the deployment of troops to the Balkans and Somalia. A broad acceptance by politicians and the public was also stimulated by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which approved a revised interpretation of the German constitution in 1994.²⁶³ Likewise, Great Britain increasingly uses force abroad in support of peace missions. The modification of Britain's security culture mainly concerns the change of the purpose of its deployments. Until the end of the Cold

260. Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force," 328.

261. See for the example of Germany, Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 23.

262. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*, 67.

263. The decision of the German Federal Constitution Court, 1994, BVerfGE (Federal Constitution Court) 90, no. 286, translated in (1994) 106 *International Law Reports* 321.

War, British military forces were, for the most part, engaged abroad with the intention of guarding the country's own (colonial) interests. Since then, Great Britain executes the use of force abroad mostly in a multilateral framework in connection with peace operations. Lastly, Switzerland has gradually increased its engagement in peace operations from almost none to armed deployments of military personnel.

Hence, there is a significant convergence in the way the three countries use force abroad. Initially, there is consensus that peace operations are necessary and, amongst other instruments, are a task of armed forces. One can argue that there is "now the process of trying to develop a security framework that incorporates both civilian and military instruments and [to] apply them in a coherent framework to meet commonly agreed security objectives."²⁶⁴ In other words, the lowest common denominator is the participation in peace operations beyond a country's own borders including by military means. Moreover, the security cultures of the three examined countries converge on the notion that diplomacy not backed by military force may produce a catastrophe.²⁶⁵

A further convergence, the will to share the burdens beyond financial or logistic support, is also obvious. This includes, as a last consequence, also the acceptance of casualties. In this respect, Switzerland experienced a great modification. From a very limited mission in Korea, as well as logistic and financial support for UN operations, Switzerland moved to the deployment of mechanized infantry units to Kosovo and military personnel to Afghanistan. Likewise, Germany made the step from mainly financial support of peace operations to the deployment of large contingents of ground troops.

264. Gerrard Quille, "The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security Interests?" *International Peacekeeping* 11 (Autumn 2004): 434.

265. Klaus Becher, "Has-been, wannabe, or leader: Europe's role in the world after the 2003 European Security Strategy," in *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*, ed. Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) 352. The author mentions as main examples the events in the Balkans in the 1990s, in particular the case of Srebrenica. Similarly, Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force," 332, which also adds the experience of Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Somalia as examples of failure.

Regarding the goals for the use of force abroad, commonality pertains to the attitudes on humanitarian interventions abroad.²⁶⁶ However, views on other goals, such as additional political or economic ones are not shared by the three countries. Only Great Britain's security culture, particularly with the adoption of the "Blair Doctrine," allows the prosecution of such objectives. Accordingly, for the EU member one can state that

while humanitarian intervention to prevent material human suffering seems to be generally accepted as a legitimate aim of coercive action as witnessed in Kosovo and more recently in the Congolese Bunia as the first genuine application of ESDP, the promotion of democracy, freedom or market economy does not appear as a consensus issue among member states.²⁶⁷

There is a further difference among Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland in respect to the level of force which may be used abroad. In other words, it is about the question of whether peace enforcement operations, besides operations for peace keeping and peace building, are permissible. In Great Britain and Switzerland, the situation is clear. While peace enforcement operations are not a problem for Great Britain, in Switzerland, such missions are not authorized by the military law in force.²⁶⁸ In contrast, Germany's attitude towards peace enforcement operations is ambiguous. Generally, the use of military force abroad is limited to peace keeping and peace building missions. The case of Kosovo is perceived as an exception. However, Germany is committed to ESDP and therefore also to the "Petersberg tasks," which include peace enforcement. As the German Parliament has to approve all deployments of military forces abroad, the question of whether to participate in peace

266. Christoph O. Meyer, "Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 523 (2005): 543.

267. Christoph O. Meyer, *Theorising European Strategic Culture. Between Convergence and the Persistence of National Diversity*. (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2004), 19.

enforcement operations or not will remain a political one. This constitutive approval of the Parliament gives all parties a voice in the decision to deploy military forces.²⁶⁹

In sum, in the realm of deployment of military forces abroad, the positions of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland have clearly converged in the last twenty years. However, there are still differences in respect to the goals of operations abroad and the level of force to accomplish them. The first missions under the aegis of ESDP confirm this, at least for Germany and Great Britain. Consequently, the near future will most likely see a consolidation of the attained commonalities but not an expansion of aims or the level of force.

(2) *What are the adjustments in preferences for multilateral versus bilateral approaches in the international system?* In all three countries, the security culture tends to foster multilateral action in the framework of security institutions. However, all states reserve the right to pursue bilateral paths or, in the case of Great Britain, to act multilaterally outside of security institutions. The reasons for stepping outside a multilateral or institutionalized structure vary from country to country. Germany mainly acts bilaterally when the respective issue is not dealt with in multilateral institutions. Examples can be found in areas regarding environment or energy. Great Britain acts outside of security institutions when security institutions, such as the UN, do not come up with a desired result. Switzerland, finally, sometimes treads the bilateral path because of neutrality restrictions.

Overall, the security cultures of Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland today generally favor multilateral solutions in an institutionalized structure. In this respect, one may argue that this demonstrates a convergence of the different positions regarding multilateral acting. Yet, there is not complete commonality.

268. Bundesversammlung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft. *Bundesgesetz ueber die Armee and die Militaerverwaltung (Militaergesetz, MG)* vom 3. February 1995, Art. 66a.

269. Charlotte Ku, and Harloid K. Jacobsen, "Toward a mixed system of democratic accountability," in *Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law*, ed. Charlotte Ku and Harloid K. Jacobsen (Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 366.

Differences can also be detected when it comes to the question of a necessary mandate by an international organization for the use of force. Great Britain's "multilateralism a la carte" does not perceive the approval of an international security institution as necessary for the use of force. The participation in the war in Iraq, without a decision by the UN or another security institution, confirms Britain's attitude in this connection. In contrast, Swiss military law clearly demands a UN or an OSCE mandate for the deployment of military personnel. Likewise, in Germany, based on the 1994 judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, a "system of mutual collective security" has to authorize the use of force. One of the main questions of German constitutional law is whether NATO is such an institution of mutual collective security.²⁷⁰ As a result, the following statement by Rynning has to be understood as a general rule:

It is fair to reason that the European use of force will likely resemble that of the doctrine of just war: military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law (*jus ad bellum*) and the use of force will be severely constrained (*jus in bello*).²⁷¹

One may argue whether the intervention in Kosovo or the participation of Great Britain, among several other European countries in the war in Iraq, are only exceptions which confirm this general rule. Therefore, it is safer to speak of at least a "solidifying consensus on multilateralism and international law."²⁷²

(3) *How has the relationship to multilateral security institutions developed?* First, in Germany's security culture, the priorities have shifted slowly from its strong commitment to NATO towards ESDP. Likewise, Great Britain has approached a close connection to the European security structure; above all with the rapprochement to France at the 1998 summit in Saint-Malo. Accordingly, one

270. Nolte, "Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability," 241.

271. Sten Rynning, "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?"

272. Christoph O. Meyer, "Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," 544.

can observe a “fading attachment to NATO.”²⁷³ However, both countries, Germany and Great Britain, still maintain a strong relationship to NATO and therefore also to the U.S. As a result, convergence among the two EU members, Germany and Great Britain, is seen in the sense that both countries advocate the EU as strong actor on its own in security issues.²⁷⁴

In contrast, the modification in Switzerland’s security culture is not related to moves between the transatlantic and the European security structure. Rather, since the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has approached multilateral security institutions, namely the UN and PfP, for the first time at all. Nevertheless, like Germany and Great Britain, Switzerland does not take part exclusively in one security institution, but tries to be involved in the transatlantic and the European pillars. The former is oriented towards PfP and the participation in NATO operations, such as Kosovo or Afghanistan; the latter towards participation in European operations, for example in Bosnia.

As a result, there is commonality among the examined security cultures as concerns the value of multilateral security institutions. Moreover, all countries are not only involved in one multilateral security institution but try to build up a network of participation. Meyer summarizes the adjustments in Europe as follows:

Ideas about the nation’s collaboration with other actors in security governance have also been affected, motivating the neutrals to become more outward-looking, particularly to the EU, while the traditionally more Atlanticist nations are gradually pulling away from cooperation with the US only to open possibilities of intra-EU sharing of defence competences. Convergence thus seems to affect all countries, not just the more pacific, neutral or defensive strategic cultures, but it does so in different ways.²⁷⁵

273. Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Toward a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms,” 544.

274. Ibid., 545.

275. Christoph O. Meyer, *Theorising European Strategic Culture. Between Convergence and the Persistence of National Diversity*, 19.

(4) *What are the changes in democratic accountability for the use of force abroad?* All of these countries have developed ways to involve democratic elements in order to revise the decision of governments before they use force abroad. In this connection, the general role of parliaments to debate the use of force in concrete situations has become a commonality among European States. In Germany, the 1994 judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court demanded that a majority of the Parliament support the decision to deploy forces. In contrast, the legal situation in Great Britain is different, because there is no law or court decision which stipulates such scrutiny. However, in Britain's political reality, the debate in the Parliament, although without direct commitment for the government, has become part of its security culture. Finally, in Switzerland, Swiss military law regulates that, starting from a fixed strength or length, the deployment has to be approved by the Parliament.

Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the acceptance of the comprehensive approach towards security may explain the modifications and adjustments in security cultures. Moreover, the thesis reveals that the adjustments, based on the notion of comprehensive security, lead to convergence in the security cultures among European states. In contrast to other factors which influence security cultures, the adoption of comprehensive security took place slowly and incrementally. However, because of a reciprocal effect from comprehensive security to security culture, the modifications in both areas are sustainable. Hence, the adoption of comprehensive security in the examined countries has led to a convergence in the security cultures.

Furthermore, the thesis shows that the convergence of security culture in the examined areas of multilateralism and use of force is not a complete one. Each security culture, on all levels, is heterogeneous. It is the amount of commonality that decides whether there is a common security culture. In this respect, the thesis reveals that there are, despite a strong vector of convergence, still deeply entrenched elements of national security cultures in the particular countries. The debate over the 2003 war in Iraq among European countries is

one of the examples which uncovered basic differences in the particular states. Nevertheless, since then, there have been encouraging events which prove that a shared security culture truly emerges. On the ESDP level, the adoption of the ESS in 2003, the successful missions (partly including Switzerland) of ESDP, and the counter-terrorism strategy in 2005 are examples. Moreover, although Switzerland is not part of the EU or ESDP, respectively, it is obvious that the neutral country follows a similar path regarding multilateralism and the use of force.

Finally, this thesis examined only some aspects of multilateralism and the use of force. Further essential elements that decide about a shared security culture, such as a common threat perception, the will to engage military and civilian instruments comprehensively, or the question about the role of military forces in police tasks will need to be validated by additional studies. Despite the need for further research, this thesis has found clear evidence for the emergence of a shared security culture in Europe, based on a more comprehensive approach to security.

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